

JPRS-WER-87-019

13 MARCH 1987

# West Europe Report

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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

### CONTENTS

#### POLITICAL

##### DENMARK

Schluter, Cabinet Members on Goals if Government Wins Election (Carl Otto Brix; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 28 Dec 86) .....	1
Security Policy, Taxes Seen as Main Issues for Schluter in 1987 (Carl Otto Brix; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 1 Jan 87) .....	5
Poll Shows Decline in Support for All Coalition Parties (Per Lyngby; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 4 Jan 87) .....	9

##### DENMARK/GREENLAND

Greenland Affairs Minister Sees Early Transfer of Powers (Per Lyngby; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 4 Jan 87) .....	12
--	----

##### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Paper Analyzes Genscher's Response to Gorbachev's Reforms (Editorial, Guenther Gillessen; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 14 Feb 87) .....	13
--	----

##### GREECE

ND's Mitsotakis Reportedly Launches New Strategy (TO VIMA, 8 Feb 87) .....	15
---	----

##### NORWAY

Conservative Paper: Center, Christian Parties Block Unity (AFTENPOSTEN, various dates) .....	17
---	----

Christian Party Leader Attacked, Editorial	17
Bondevik Replies to Charges, by Kjell Magne Bondevik	18
Prolonging Labor Government, Editorial	19
Center Party Chief Comments, Johan J. Jakobsen Interview	20
Progressive Party Leader Comments, C.I. Hagen Interview	22
Nonsocialist Voters Feel Betrayed, Editorial	24
<b>Nonsocialist Parties Facing Increasingly Strong Brundtland (Various sources, various dates) .....</b>	<b>25</b>
Opposition Missed Autumn Opportunity, Editorial	25
Brundtland Increasingly Dominating Party, by Morten Malmo	26
Nonsocialists Discuss Renewed Cooperation, by Thorleif Andreassen	28
<b>Socialist Left Party Seen To Have Solved Leadership Impasse (Thorleif Andreassen; AFTENPOSTEN, 21 Jan 87) .....</b>	<b>31</b>
 <b>TURKEY</b>	
Assimilation of Muslims in USSR Reported (TERCUMAN, 8 Oct 86) .....	33
TCP Impact on Communist Assimilation in Bulgaria (Mehmet Cavus; TERCUMAN, 8 Oct 86) .....	35
Syrian Minister's Comments on Expecting Turkish Support Reported (Togay Bayatli; MILLIYET, 16 Nov 86) .....	37
PLO Representative on Message From Arafat (MILLIYET, 16 Nov 86) .....	39
Government Urged To Be More Energetic in Iran Problems (Fahir Armaoglu; TERCUMAN, 5 Nov 86) .....	43
Impact of Changing World Configuration (Metin Toker; MILLIYET, various dates) .....	45
Domestic Patterns Shifting	45
Armed Forces Key to World Position	47
Sahinkaya Conflict of Interest Proposal Readied (CUMHURIYET, 5 Oct 86) .....	50
Call for Full Restoration of Democracy (Yilmaz Oztuna; TERCUMAN, various dates) .....	53
Developments on Right Wing Spectrum (Ugur Mumcu; CUMHURIYET, 22 Oct 86) .....	57

#### SOCIAL

#### GREECE

Poll Results on Youth Attitudes, Beliefs, Priorities (Stratis Atarellis; ENA, 1 Jan 87) .....	60
--	----

**TURKEY**

<b>Headcover Dispute in Academic Community</b> (TERCUMAN, 4 Nov 86) .....	67
<b>Editorial Blasts Preoccupation With Dress,</b> by Taha Akyol <b>'Turban' Ban Lifted</b>	67
68	
<b>Separatist Party Officer Arrested</b> (TERCUMAN, 8 Oct 86) .....	70
<b>Census Shows 50.5 Million Population</b> (CUMHURIYET, 22 Oct 86) .....	71

**ECONOMIC****BELGIUM**

<b>Differences Between Economy in Flanders, Wallonia Narrow</b> (DE STANDAARD, 29 Dec 86) .....	72
--	----

**DENMARK**

<b>LO Chairman Christensen on Wage Talks, Elections, SDP Tie</b> (Arne Thing; AKTUELDT, 26 Dec 86) .....	75
---	----

**GREECE**

<b>Briefs</b>	
Drop in Trade With USSR	79
Employment, Unemployment Statistics	79

**MILITARY****DENMARK**

<b>Armed Forces Commander's Book: Defenses Still Credible</b> (AKTUELDT, 3 Jan 87) .....	80
<b>Combat School Chief Discusses Problems Revealed in Exercise</b> (Peter Bergen; AKTUELDT, 20 Dec 86) .....	81
<b>Debate on Upcoming Defense Program Centers on Policy Views</b> (Jakob Vinde Larsen, Steen Valgreen-Voigt; INFORMATION, 24 Dec 86) .....	83

**FRANCE**

<b>Costs, Projects of New Defense Budget Analyzed</b> (Georges Vincent; DEFENSE NATIONAL, Jan 87) .....	90
--	----

GREECE

Dissatisfaction Over Government's Aircraft Purchase Handling (Various sources, various dates) .....	96
Offsets Reportedly Overlooked, by Nikos Simos	96
Policy Errors Scored	97
Purchase Differentiation Seen Onerous	98

NORWAY

Conservative Paper, Military Groups Join Holst, Bull-Hansen Duel (AFTENPOSTEN, various dates) .....	103
Defense Policy, Budget Issues, Editorial	103
Association Official Attacks Muzzling	104
Security Affairs Expert Comments, by Nils Orvik	105
Military Journal Supports Bull-Hansen	106
Paper Attacks Speaking Ban, Editorial	107
Paper Reasserts Criticism of Center Party for Defense Stand (Editorial; AFTENPOSTEN, 24 Jan 87) .....	108
Deregistering of Merchant Fleet Would Hurt NATO in War (Cato Guhnfeldt; AFTENPOSTEN, 30 Jan 87) .....	110
Coast Guard Experiencing Difficulties With Sea Lynx Copters (Cato Guhnfeldt; AFTENPOSTEN, 30 Jan 87) .....	112
Paper Attacks Center Party Chief for Comments on Defenses (Editorial; AFTENPOSTEN, 21 Jan 87) .....	114

SWEDEN

Naval Officers, Nonsocialist MP's Protest Minister's Comment (Various sources, various dates) .....	116
Naval Officer: 'Immensely Provocative', by Roger Magnergard, Sune Olofson	116
Carl Bildt Attacks Comment, by Roger Magnergard, Sune Olofson	117
Roine Carlsson's Background Analyzed, by Peter Bratt	118

## SCHLUTER, CABINET MEMBERS ON GOALS IF GOVERNMENT WINS ELECTION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Dec 86 Sect II pp 6-7

[Article by Carl Otto Brix]

[Text] "Such perfect idyl does not exist in my own family," says Erik Werner, cartoonist, after listening for an hour to the most prominent cabinet ministers, whom BERLINGSKE TIDENDE has gathered for an interview in order to take stock of things before the start of the 1987 election year.

Prime Minister Poul Schluter (Conservative Party), Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Liberal Party), Minister of Social Affairs Mimi Stilling Jakobsen (Center Democrats), and Minister of Environment Chr. Christensen (Christian People's Party) were not just influenced by the cozy atmosphere of the Christmas season when praising one another at the prime minister's coffee table for the outstanding cooperation for more than 4 years. The cooperation of the coalition has been thoroughly tested in its daily toil, and it is now so well-established that the four leaders will seek to carry it on after the election.

If the Voters Want it!

[Carl Otto Brix] Do you share the general astonishment at your ability to maintain your coalition for such a long time?

[Poul Schluter] We are all of us gratified by it. When forming the government, we were firmly intent on a close cooperation, and we realized that it was an experiment. But I suppose that we may say that we have succeeded and that it has changed the climate and the structure of Danish politics.

[Uffe Ellemann-Jensen] We have, of course, been astonished, and we may have been more so earlier on than we are today. We should now be astonished if we should not be able to remain in power next year and the following year.

[Mimi Stilling Jakobsen] We probably stuck together at first because we had to. But the solidarity has definitely come to comprise the people who have now been working together for some years. We know one another well. We know which of us have soft spots, where they are and how to tackle them.

[Chr. Christensen] Nobody thought at the time that it would work. I do not want to say that we did not ourselves believe in it, but we did not believe that the opposition would accept it. Why has it then worked? Well, I believe that all four of us realized that it was a historical event. If it did not work, a nonsocialist cooperation would be unattainable for many years to come.

#### Respect for One Another

[Carl Otto Brix] Which party has furthered the cooperation the most?

[Uffe Ellemann-Jensen] The Social Democratic Party! The cooperation was furthered by the extremely difficult situation created by the Social Democratic Party in Danish politics by suddenly withdrawing from the ranks of parties capable of forming a government.

[Chr. Christensen] We are able to act with such vigor because we respect the fact that we are extremely different.

[Carl Otto Brix] What did you not manage to carry through during the past election period?

[Poul Schluter] After 4 years we realize that you never finish the political work. It is like a grocery store--and I do not have any particular store in mind--where each year you take stock to find out how things went during the past year. In politics, new things happen constantly. We have achieved many quite nice results, but we have not solved all of the problems.

[Mimi Stilling Jakobsen] One of the things we probably have to recognize we did not achieve is convincing a sufficiently large section of the population that the alternative to this government is total insecurity. The very broad ideological basis of the coalition parties ought to enable us to obtain a broader support among the voters. For we are not philistine.

[Carl Otto Brix] Is it the educational task that has been neglected?

[Mimi Stilling Jakobsen] We have, of course, been extremely busy thinking along new lines all the time, and as a result, we may have forgotten to follow them up with explanations what the new things mean to the individual.

[Uffe Ellemann-Jensen] We should not forget that the tasks confronting us were enormous. I should like to draw the attention to the words of Stauning: "We have gone far, but there are still big tasks to be solved." We have still got the balance of payments problem, and the results we have achieved in the area of modernization are inadequate.

[Chr. Christensen] I do not feel sorry when looking at the things we have achieved. I feel happy. Our foremost goal was, of course, to set objectives for ourselves in the area of the economy. We were forced to do so, and we have achieved a great deal. We are now able to spend our energy in other areas of the society than the economic policy area.

[Carl Otto Brix] What does the government want to do about the fact that it has lost its credibility in the security policy area?

[Uffe Ellemann-Jensen] We shall rebuild and restore the credibility in the security policy area. So far we have managed to remove the footnotes from NATO. That is associated with changed political balances, which hopefully will give us a calmer sea to work in. The next thing we have to do is to come up with a defense arrangement which is credible in the eyes of our allies.

[Carl Otto Brix] Are the footnotes gone forever because you have succeeded in avoiding them once?

[Uffe Ellemann-Jensen] I shall find it very important to avoid footnotes in the future.

[Carl Otto Brix] Is the security policy the main reason why it has not been possible to arrange a more permanent cooperation with the big opposition party, the Social Democratic Party?

[Poul Schluter] The main reason is the internal difficulties of the Social Democratic Party. These are almost daily demonstrated by the party. The Social Democratic Party is undergoing a very difficult crisis, and that is not very strange. It is associated with the fact that the period of monopoly of the Social Democratic Party in Danish politics is expiring. That causes strong internal frictions, and it will probably be still some years before the party will have matured enough to face the conditions of a new time.

[Carl Otto Brix] Why is it only within the Liberal Party and the Christian People's Party that there have been visible tendencies toward rebellion against the line pursued by the government?

[Mimi Stilling Jakobsen] Members of the Folketing have a need to mark their positions. That is actually also their task, and that may be difficult if they lack a proper opponent, which they do not have. They cannot play against the Social Democratic Party, for they cannot really figure that out. However, I find that it has only been a question of periodic frustrations.

#### Government of Many Colors

[Carl Otto Brix] Would you actually have liked to see more "rebels," enabling the voters to see that it is a question of several parties and not a total gray mass?

(Four protests against that expression)

[Chr. Christensen] The government is not gray, but composed of a multitude of colors. The strength of the government is the very respect for this interplay of colors, and that creates respect outside the government. As far as my own party is concerned, a poll that was taken some time ago showed that 64 percent

of the voters found that this constellation will have to continue. I completely share the opinion of this large majority. The Christian People's Party will have more of its policy carried through by participating in the coalition than by being outside the government.

[Carl Otto Brix] What is the internal cooperation like?

[Chr. Christensen] I have never left a cabinet meeting with the feeling that something had to be forced through. There is a mutual respect, and it does not depend on the size of the party.

[Uffe Ellemann-Jensen] The mutual respect is our secret, and the cooperation has been rendered possible by the government chief's talents as a leader.

[Mimi Stilling Jakobsen] The mutual willingness to help and friendliness are now in the fifth year combined with a high degree of optimism. Good form and a cheerful remark which may solve a situation that has reached a deadlock.

[Carl Otto Brix] Is there no criticism?

[Uffe Ellemann-Jensen] My only criticism of my colleagues is that we do not represent the majority of the population together.

[Carl Otto Brix] What will be the requirements of the parties in order to continue the government?

[Uffe Ellemann-Jensen] Demands and conditions may, of course, prevent us from continuing, and the Liberal Party wants a continuation of this government.

[Poul Schluter] A new government which I definitely expect my government to want to participate in will have gone so far in solving the economic problems that there will be time to devote oneself more to ideology, education, culture, etc.

[Carl Otto Brix] Will the parties also be able to stick together during a period of opposition with a Social Democratic minority government?

[Poul Schluter] Yes, but that will, of course, be more difficult, as the four parties will not have quite the same daily mutual interests as those created in the government cooperation. But the fact that they have had a government cooperation for many years will mark the four parties also when they get into opposition. That cooperation cannot be erased.

[Mimi Stilling Jakobsen] If the country gets a Red cabinet, the problems will not be too big for the four-leaf-clover.

7262  
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**SECURITY POLICY, TAXES SEEN AS MAIN ISSUES FOR SCHLUTER IN 1987**

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Jan 87 Sect 1 p 9

[Article by Carl Otto Brix]

[Text] Even if the general elections will have a decisive influence on events in 1987, there are certain urgent matters that will have to be undertaken by the parties, one of the reasons being that the parties are bound by agreements across the Folketing.

All political actions in 1987 will be influenced by the general elections which are expected to take place in the fall, unless, of course, the collective bargaining situation in the spring will compel the prime minister to issue writs for general elections in the spring. For that is solely his decision.

However, the politicians carry some difficult issues with them into the new year, and they will have to take a position on those issues, irrespective of general elections.

The security and defense policy will, as far as time is concerned, be at the top of the list this year. In March, the provisional security policy committee of the Folketing will have to present its report, and it will then turn out whether it has been possible to achieve anything like the broad agreement existing in previous times in the security policy area.

Today there is little indication that this is the case.

Last year, Svend Auken, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party, wrote a commentary in preparation of the negotiations between the government and the large opposition party on the possibilities of restoring cooperation in the security policy area. The government took the opportunity immediately. It asked Peter Dyvig, permanent undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to prepare a report on the security policy situation for Denmark. With the report as its point of departure, a parliamentary committee was subsequently set up.

The government tried to persuade the chairman of the Folketing, Svend Jakobsen (Social Democratic Party), to take over the leadership in the work of the

committee--perhaps in the hope of making the opposition jointly responsible for the achievement of a result. They were not successful, and it was then the chairman of the Conservative Folketing group, Knud Østergaard, who was entrusted with the difficult task.

#### The Government Had to Bite the Dust

Since its take-over 4 years ago, the government has had to bite the dust a score of times. Security policy proposals have been adopted by a majority outside the government, and the government has chosen to live with it. The reason was that the government had a more important objective: the recovery of the Danish economy.

This, in turn, has meant that the government cannot take its stand on the security policy as a vital basis. The elastic has been stretched to such a point as to lose its elasticity.

It is true that Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Liberal Party) now states that the government will restore its security policy credibility. This will be accomplished, among other things, by preventing Danish footnotes in connection with NATO meetings, and the foreign minister points out quite proudly that he managed to do that in the most recent NATO meeting of foreign ministers.

Ellemann-Jensen has previously said that, in his opinion, the government will have to lay down the security policy line and then leave it to the opposition to overturn it if it will then be possible to achieve a majority for a vote of censure.

In this connection, he expects the Radical Liberal Party to want to retain the government.

Prime Minister Poul Schluter's line has been very cautious. He wants no confrontation with the Radical Liberal Party if it will be possible to avoid it.

Foreign observers of Danish politics find it difficult to understand that a government is able to remain in office despite the fact that the majority opposes it on a vital issue.

#### Agreement with the Social Democratic Party

The whole thing is not rendered easier by the fact that also on the defense policy, which is closely connected with the security policy, the government seeks to reach agreement with the Social Democratic Party.

The government and the Social Democratic Party have a defense agreement which will expire by the end of 1987 and which therefore should preferably be renewed in the course of the year.

The debate is already in progress. Defense Minister Hans Engell (Conservative Party) has said that they will need an additual expenditure of 800 million kroner to retain the credibility of the Danish defense system. The chairman

of the Social Democratic Party, Anker Jørgensen, will be demanding a zero-solution.

At the same time as the possibilities of a coalition composed of the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party are being thoroughly examined, the Social Democratic Party is willing to negotiate, and possibly enter into, a new defense agreement with the nonsocialist parties.

No wonder that foreign observers--as well as Danes--find it difficult to figure out the political reality.

In three other areas, the government and the Social Democratic Party are tied together in a common destiny which will be marking the political life in the new year.

1. The tax reform will take effect at the new year. For ordinary people, the reform will apply to the tax returns they will be filing in February of 1988 for their incomes in 1987, but already now it is clear that it will involve one of the largest information tasks undertaken by the state. If the reform proves to be a failure, the effects will be equally severe on either side of the dividing line in Danish politics, and the Radical Liberal Party shares the responsibility in this respect.

2. The government and the Social Democratic Party agreed on the fixed Great Belt connection right before the summer recess of 1986, but it will be in 1987 that all of their ideas will have to be implemented. The Social Democratic Party has already complained of the fact that the government earmarked only 150 million kroner under the budget for the Great Belt corporation. The Social Democratic Party finds that the amount ought to have been 400 million kroner instead.

But there is another confusing issue in this context. The government entered into an agreement with the Radical Liberal Party on the budget, but the Radical Liberal Party is not a party to the Great Belt agreement.

3. Nor is the Radical Liberal Party a party to the agreement on the hybrid communications network. The government and the Social Democratic Party are the only parties to that agreement. This modern communications system will in 1987 have to prove its worth, but critics now also comprise members of the coalition parties. Is it a solid technological and economic advance, or is it an enormous investment error? The demand for an answer to this question will gather momentum in 1987.

The Social Democratic Party was relieved in its efforts to find a competitor to the Danish Broadcasting Corporation: a TV-2 partially financed through advertising. It will thus be the government and the Radical Liberal Party that will be held responsible if TV-2 proves to be identical with TV-1 and not the competitor which the majority has desired for many years.

This issue, too, will have to be clarified in 1987.

**Behind the individual issues looms the threat posed by the Danish trade deficit.**

**If the debt increases at the same rate as in the previous years, it may become the government's Waterloo.**

7262  
CSO: 3613/41

## POLL SHOWS DECLINE IN SUPPORT FOR ALL COALITION PARTIES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Jan 87 p 5

[Article by Per Lyngby]

[Text] All four parties of the nonsocialist four-leaf-clover government experienced a setback compared to the most recent election. If Poul Schluter (Conservative Party) wants to continue as prime minister, he will have to seek the support both of the Radical Liberal Party and the Progressive Party.

This appeared from the Gallup poll for December. The voters were asked which party they will vote for if a general election were to take place tomorrow.

For the first time since the general election in January of 1984, all of the four parties of the coalition experienced setbacks. Each party lost a seat compared to the election.

On the other hand, the party supporting the government, the Radical Liberal Party, is making such gains that the party is likely to gain an additional seat. But, in total, the government and the Radical Liberal Party experienced setbacks from 89 to 84 of the 175 seats in the Danish parliament.

The Progressive Party will thus hold the balance with its six seats, according to the December poll of the Gallup Institute.

The Social Democratic Party gains one seat compared with the election, and the Socialist People's Party two seats. Together with the Socialist Left Party, which gets five seats, the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party have 85 seats.

All of the nine parties in the Folketing obtained more than 2 percent of the vote. A vote of less than 2 percent bars access to the Folketing.

# (1) Politisk indeks

Indsamlingsperiode: (2)  
1. dec. – 20. dec. 1986.

	(4) 10. jan. 1984	(5) juni 1986	(6) aug. 1986	(7) sept. 1986	(8) okt. 1986	(9) nov. 1986	(10) dec. 1986
<b>Socialdemokratiet (12)....</b>	31.6	31.1	30.7	29.5	30.4	31.2	31.7
<b>Radikale Venstre (13)....</b>	5.5	5.1	4.1	5.0	3.7	5.6	6.1
<b>Konservative Folkeparti (14)...</b>	23.4	23.4	25.8	24.7	23.1	23.8	23.0
<b>Retsforbundet (15).....</b>	1.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Socialistisk Folkeparti (16)...</b>	11.5	14.7	14.5	16.3	18.1	14.2	12.9
<b>De Grønne (17).....</b>	.	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Det Humanistiske Parti (18)</b>	.	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Inter.soc. Arbejderparti (19)</b>	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Kommunistisk Parti (20) ..</b>	0.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Marx.-Leninistisk Parti (21)</b>	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Centrum-Demokraterne (22)</b>	4.6	4.0	3.6	3.1	2.6	4.9	3.6
<b>Kristeligt Folkeparti (23) ..</b>	2.7	2.9	2.2	2.4	2.9	-	2.2
<b>Venstre (24).....</b>	12.1	12.4	11.7	12.5	12.3	11.9	11.9
<b>Venstresocialisterne (25) ..</b>	2.7	-	-	-	-	-	2.5
<b>Fremskridtspartiet (26)...</b>	3.6	2.7	2.8	3.6	2.3	-	3.4
<b>Andre partier* (27)....</b>	-	3.7	4.6	2.9	4.6	8.4	2.7
<b>I alt (28).....</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

\* Partier med mindre end 2 pct. af stemmerne. (29)  
Efstetryk kun mod anførelse af Gallup og Berlingske som kilde. (30)

(3) Spørgsmål: Hvilket parti ville De stemme på, hvis der var folketingsvalg i morgen?

**Key:**

1. Political index
2. Period during which poll was taken: 1 December - 20 December 1986
3. Question: Which party would you vote for if an election to the Folketing were to take place tomorrow?
4. 10 January
5. June
6. August
7. September
8. October
9. November
10. December
11. Percent
12. Social Democratic Party
13. Radical Liberal Party
14. Conservative Party
15. Single-Tax Party
16. Socialist People's Party
17. The Greens
18. Humanistic Party
19. International Socialist Workers Party
20. Communist Party
21. Marxist-Leninist Party
22. Center Democrats
23. Christian People's Party
24. Liberal Party
25. Left-Socialist Party
26. Progressive Party
27. Other parties
28. Total
29. Parties with less than 2 percent of the vote
30. Reprinting subject to indication of Gallup and BERLINGSKE TIDENDE as sources.

7262

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**GREENLAND AFFAIRS MINISTER SEES EARLY TRANSFER OF POWERS**

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Jan 87 p 5

[Article by Per Lyngby]

[Text] The Greenland home-rule government wants to manage its own affairs. Greenland Affairs Minister Tom Høyem (Center Democrats) would like to be informed at an early point for the sake of the security of the personnel.

The Ministry of Greenland Affairs will not last long. The Greenland home-rule government wants to take over the administration of the health sector by the end of 1987, and it would then be "unrealistic to imagine an independent Greenland ministry after that date," says Greenland Affairs Minister Tom Høyem (Center Democrats).

For the Greenland ministry will be left with only the raw materials administration, including the cryolite concessions. The Danish government is willing to transfer the health sector to the Greenland home-rule government. Tom Høyem points out that it takes time to pass the necessary legislation. And they also have to take into consideration the interests of the personnel of the ministry.

"It is important for me that the personnel of the ministry is given the greatest possible security in its work. That can only be achieved through thorough planning well ahead of time," says Tom Høyem.

7262  
CSO: 3613/41

**PAPER ANALYZES GENSCHER'S RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV'S REFORMS**

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 14 Feb 87 p 1

[Editorial by Guenther Gillessen: "Advance Pay for Gorbachev?"]

[Text] It is as yet unclear whether the changes in Soviet domestic policy will remain an episode, or if they are the beginning of the Soviet system's permanent turning away from its tyrannical practices. These practices are not simply an historical aberration, but rather are an essential part of this secular political doctrine of salvation. Gorbachev would have to want more than "democratization" of a Leninist party in permanent possession of state power in order to attain that productive "openness" he is trying to introduce into Soviet society.

Still, the changes during the past months are noteworthy, particularly if one observes their sequence: Moscow's agreement at the Stockholm CDE Conference to rudimentary forms of international verification of the so-called confidence-building measures in the military sector; the willingness, proclaimed in Reykjavik, to sacrifice large parts of the Soviet nuclear arsenal to disarmament; proposals for a withdrawal from Afghanistan; the release of Sakharov and, subsequently, of other political prisoners—all that remains astonishing even if several important "buts" can be added to each of these steps.

The greatest sensation was caused by Gorbachev's speech in which he tried to make it clear to his party that the Soviet Union would not catch up with the next century unless it were to find more effective forms of leadership and selection of leadership personnel. Here, also, many "buts" are apropos. There is strong resistance, not only among parochial functionaries, but also among political thinkers who understand that Gorbachev is trying to do something which is either not enough or, if he should want more, could set off avalanches which might endanger the Soviet power system as a whole.

For the Western countries the question arises to what extent they must adapt their policies to the new situation. Does what is happening in the Soviet Union also mean a change of course in foreign policy beyond the merely tactical? Do long-held opinions on the aggressiveness of the Soviet dictatorship turn out to be prejudices, obstacles on the road to a more

peaceful Europe? Is it necessary to break with old preconceptions about the Soviet Union?

Foreign Minister Genscher seems toward tend to that opinion. In the past few days, he has been repeating what he recently expressed in Davos for the first time: the West must now give a "joint political response" to the "new thinking" in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's new course of openness goes far beyond the policy of the Brezhnev period. One should try to "influence the development from our side, advance it and form it;" in particular, with the help of comprehensive disarmament efforts, large-scale economic cooperation and the stated willingness to occupy the "joint house of Europe" peacefully together with the Soviet Union.

This does not seem to be anything different from the Western offer of detente, proposed over two decades in ever new variations. And yet, Genscher uses a tone which draws one's attention, for example, in his criticism of Western "prejudices" vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and also in that he spared only a single --and rather unfriendly--word for the United States, but had many about "Europe" and his concern that the West might be missing an "opportunity" right now.

Genscher specifically demands nothing new or different: but the urgency of his tone nevertheless creates a contrast to the current policy of the alliance. What does Genscher really mean? A more liberal policy of detente than up to now, without a doubt. But there is not much room to maneuver, unless one were to get into the bad ways of prior performances, advance payments and careless confidence.

Naturally, the changes in the Soviet Union must be carefully observed, one even being ready to act quickly should the change prove to be a lasting improvement of the international situation. But that point has not yet been reached. And even if it were, sober attention must be paid to military balance to protect the West against its own impatience and dangerous hopes, and to the principle that there can be Western performances only under the condition of simultaneous counterconsiderations of equal value.

It would be a vain hope to offer outside help to a Soviet leader in order to strengthen his position at home. Even if Gorbachev's position were to be controversial, it would not be certain that "aid" by the West would be beneficial to the person one wants to assist, even if one knew whether one ought to him. After all, at one time Brezhnev was also recommended to us as a partner in the policy of detente, a man who needed to be supported against his reactionary opponents.

The West is in no way called upon to give Gorbachev a "joint response" to his domestic policy. First it must become clearer what is changing in the form of Soviet rule. It will be decided in the day-to-day relationship of the Soviet system with its ordinary citizens and the non-Russian peoples whether changes merit confidence or fear.

9917

CSO: 3620/144

## ND'S MITSOTAKIS REPORTEDLY LAUNCHES NEW STRATEGY

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 8 Feb 87 p 56

/Text/ All right with the government reshuffle. What is happening with New Democracy? We have lots of news today.

Mr K. Mitsotakis, ND leader, has decided on spreading out his opposition tactics because of the government reshuffle and primarily because of intra-party pressures on him. According to reliable information, these tactics have three targets:

1. Prime Minister A. Papandreu personally on whom responsibility for all government mistakes and omissions will be placed, while "his great personal responsibilities" will be emphasized.
2. The overall government picture by making use of strong charges about "scandals and rot."
3. The spreading out of the government opposition struggle through (not too frequent) trips to the provinces and the systematic promotion of the call for having elections held as soon as possible.

It is around these three points that Mr Mitsotakis' opposition tactics will revolve in the future. These tactics will have as their main feature a "summit government opposition" and not popular demonstrations, strikes and other such manifestations. Mr Mitsotakis considers these methods as being "a two-edged sword" since he believes that they could operate to ND's detriment, specifically in creating an atmosphere conducive to having PASOK's forces rallying together and leading the communist Left to a "coalescence stance."

These three points for new opposition tactics characterized yesterday's speech by Mr Mitsotakis at the Sporting Club and they are now scheduled to become guidance instructions for all party organizations. With the summit government opposition and a call for elections, Mr Mitsotakis believes that he will succeed in putting an end to intra-party disputes (from the Politeia / former President Karamanlis' residence/ and press that is "friendly" to him) and in overcoming his party weaknesses, such as the lack of a program, etc.

Nevertheless, in private discussions, Mr Mitsotakis is said to believe that parliamentary elections cannot be held in 1987, specifically in October as he had "anticipated" some time ago. Mr Mitsotakis' views certainly suggest his inability to exercise "decisive pressure" on the government and Mr Papandreu personally in view of forcing them to hold "early elections." The latest government reshuffle, according to evaluations by Mr Mitsotakis' associates, has removed any possibility for such early elections and also any "apparent prospect" for a possible move by Mr Papandreu to get to the presidency of the republic.

Mr Mitsotakis still feels that parliamentary elections could be held in the spring of next year at the earliest.

This prospect has created feelings of despair among certain close associates of Mr Mitsotakis who suggested at the last meeting of the executive committee that Mr Mitsotakis effect "political and other overtures" to Mr Sartzetakis (!) in view of having a "pressure front" formed against Mr Papandreu!!

5671  
CSO: 3521/77

**CONSERVATIVE PAPER: CENTER, CHRISTIAN PARTIES BLOCK UNITY****Christian Party Leader Attacked**

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Dec 86 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] From voters' point of view, this has been a bad year for nonsocialist politics. The fact that Kjell Magne Bondevik keeps saying that the center, i.e. the Christian People's Party and the Center Party, has strengthened its position this fall does not help much because the so-called center, as Bondevik sees it, is not--and doubtfully will ever become--an independent government alternative. Its parliamentary base is too narrow. The influence of nonsocialist politics can only be effected by a broad coalition including the Conservative Party.

It is precisely this recognition which led to efforts to form a nonsocialist coalition. Since the early sixties, the realization --and the consequences thereof--has been that no nonsocialist party alone was big enough to decide or influence future politics. In order for the nonsocialist parties to influence constructive nonsocialist policies, they would have to agree on joint solutions.

The parliamentary budget debate this fall represented a break in this cooperative pattern. Instead, the Christian People's Party chairman decided to stress the center as an independent political constellation and, on this basis, sought a practical political coalition with the Labor Party. Mr Bondevik seems to have been so impressed with the excellence of this new constellation that when interviewed by ARBEIDERBLADET before Christmas he was open to continue the--in our opinion--vacillating politics.

"We have strengthened our position politically this fall and will continue to do so in 1987," the Christian People's Party chairman proclaimed. He feels that by stressing "the center" instead of a broad nonsocialist coalition, it will be easier to pick up support on either side of the political bloc. And he is right about this, of course. But one would have to have a big and robust stomach to

tolerate this mixed political diet. We can readily understand that others in the party have started to react.

What characterizes ARBEIDERBLADET's interview with Kjell Magne Bondevik is the party chairman's failure to take a position on the nonsocialist coalition alternative, to which both he and his party earlier committed themselves. Mr Bondevik does not say one word about the responsibility he ought to feel to restore a nonsocialist government in Norway. To be sure, he does agree that top nonsocialist leaders should have some kind of permanent plan of action in the event of a crisis. But just a plan, mind you. An active and goal-oriented initiative is obviously unthinkable to him. Essentially, Bondevik's message is that we must now all "get used to work more across bloc politics."

We are disappointed in the Christian People's Party chairman and we honestly doubt that he is actually aware of the possible consequences of his new political attitude. When and if nonsocialist voters can no longer be guaranteed that their respective parties will work together to establish a nonsocialist government, it is only going to be a matter of time before the confidence crisis becomes a reality.

#### Bondevik Replies to Charges

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Dec 86 p 3

[Letter To The Editor by Kjell Magne Bondevik]

[Text] I do not intend to respond every time AFTENPOSTEN criticizes the middle parties in general or the Christian People's Party in particular because this would be too time-consuming. However, it is necessary to respond to some things, like the editorial in AFTENPOSTEN Saturday 27 December, to prevent readers from getting the wrong impression of what our position is.

The editorial is based on an interview I had with ARBEIDERBLADET. In this interview I said that I wanted to continue to strengthen "the center" politically. This should not be surprising. Likewise, I pointed out that the center can cooperate with both sides in difficult parliamentary situations. This is a sober statement of facts.

But it is no reason to call into question the Christian People's Party's position on the government issue. As everybody knows, the Christian People's Party worked hard to bring about three-party cooperation with respect to the national budget. Cooperation was not contingent upon us. A three-party government is still our primary government alternative. We shall work toward this goal and I have said so in several interviews, both before and after

Christmas. I unequivocally answered "yes" to the question of whether a three-party government was among the top items on my wish list for 1987.

AFTENPOSTEN ought to know what I stand for. (A three-party government would also be a minority government, which depending on the issue at hand would have to cooperate with either side in Parliament.)

AFTENPOSTEN is disappointed in me, and I can live with this. However, I must answer: I am also disappointed in AFTENPOSTEN, not because we disagree from time to time, but because the paper creates an impression of attitudes I do not hold, only to attack same. This does not aid cooperation either.

#### Prolonging Labor Government

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Dec 86 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] Naturally, Christian People's Party Chairman Kjell Magne Bondevik is concerned that voters not be left with the wrong impression of what his party stands for. However, the Christian People's Party's positions and actions in connection with the parliamentary budget debate this fall cannot really be misunderstood. One need only take note of the political rapprochement inherent in the agreement between the Labor Party and the two middle parties. The degree to which there may be doubt or confusion about where the Christian People's Party stands politically can primarily be attributed to the party chairman's own desire to ride two horses simultaneously.

In an article in yesterday's paper, Bondevik states that three-party cooperation with respect to the national budget was not contingent upon the Christian People's Party. In that case, the matter rests with the sighted. Conservative party leaders who also took part in the debate differ completely with Bondevik. Reliable sources have not the slightest doubt that the nonsocialist debate was a natural consequence of the fact that the Christian and Center parties chose to align themselves with the Labor Party and, in some respects, went even further than the Labor Party to raise taxes.

This obvious move to the left formed the basis for an agreement which Bondevik and other representatives from the middle parties have termed a good and proper development. Yes, and not only that: This rapprochement between Labor and the middle parties is viewed as a clear sign that "the center," i.e. the Center and Christian parties, has strengthened its position

politically. In an interview with ARBEIDERBLADET just before Christmas, a delighted Bondevik also pointed out that "this will continue in 1987."

If Bondevik wants to be believed, he cannot on the one hand claim that the present course is the right one and, at the same time, stress--as he did in yesterday's paper--that "a three-party government is still our primary government alternative." Bondevik knows very well that one precludes the other, unless he would want a nonsocialist government which with respect to central issues were to pursue Labor Party policies.

The Labor Party could (theoretically) control the government forever considering the present center-liberal course, which Bondevik says he will pursue. We shall refuse to believe this to be Bondevik's choice as long as possible. However, he must also mend his ways and quickly help restore a nonsocialist government capable of governing.

#### Center Party Chief Comments

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 28 Dec 86 p 6

[Interview with Johan J. Jakobsen by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Text] "The political center in a new three-party government cannot be far removed from the present political center in Parliament, which is center politics," Center Party chairman Johan J. Jakobsen told AFTENPOSTEN at year's end, after having celebrated Christmas with his family on Lonseter farm near Namsos.

Jakobsen does not agree that, among the former government parties, the Center Party is the least willing to cooperate. "We have stressed that the platform of a new government must be in alignment with the practical politics in Parliament."

[Question] Is a new government included on your wish list for 1987  
Johan J. Jakobsen?

[Answer] Yes, a government including the Center Party and based on politics which our party can assume responsibility for is at the top of my wish list.

Center

[Question] A three-party government governing on the premises outlined in your budget agreement with the Labor Party?

[Answer] No, because nobody has veto rights in a multi-party coalition. However, we must have a political basis we can support. This also applies to the Conservative and Christian parties. It goes without saying, however, that the political center in a new three-party government cannot be far removed from the political center in Parliament.

[Question] Do you honestly believe it is possible to establish a new three-party government next year considering the distance between the Conservative Party and the middle parties with respect to economic policy?

[Answer] A new government is possible if the Conservative Party would be willing to return to the center. The fact that Carl I. Hagen greatly praised Jan P. Syse and Morten Stenstrup during the budget debate must be somewhat of a mental cross to bear for the Conservative Party.

[Question] Many see the Center Party as being the least interested party in forming a new three-party government?

[Answer] This is not so. However, our party has been the one to most strongly stress the need for a solid political platform for said government. We have said that it is more important to stress the existence of alternative policies in terms of practical politics in Parliament than to give verbal assurances and exchange notes. This has nothing to do with weakness.

#### Realism

If anything, it expresses a realistic attitude toward government cooperation and our wish that a new three-party government not be a transitory one.

[Question] Do we really have a government alternative today?

[Answer] In the event of a crisis, I have no doubt that we would have a viable government alternative. If we were to seek government control by means of a no confidence vote, for example, the political base would have to be cleared in advance. Our joint long-term program is a good base, but it has proved to be unsatisfactory under more difficult economic circumstances.

## Progressive Party Leader Comments

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Dec 86 p 5

[Interview by Morten Malmo]

[Text] "The Christian and Center parties now display characteristics reminiscent of the Liberal Party's prolonged vacillating politics. The two parties keep jumping from the Labor Party to the Conservative Party and back again on one issue after another. The Christian People's Party is the most "reckless" and exerts the greatest pressure," Progressive Party leader Carl I. Hagen told AFTENPOSTEN in a summary of the fall session of Parliament.

Hagen felt that the Christian People's Party is now following the line pursued by the party in Oslo city council for several years. He consistently described the Christian and Center parties as "special interest parties" and figured it would be rather problematical to establish a new nonsocialist government in 1987.

"It is difficult to see how the two special-interest parties could return to the nonsocialist bloc without losing voter trust due to all the vacillating," said Hagen and added:

"Furthermore, a nonsocialist coalition is worth little if it is not also based on nonsocialist policies."

### No Regrets

[Question] The Progressive Party voted with the Labor Party and the Socialist Left Party (SV) against the Willoch government's proposal to raise the gasoline tax last April. This led to the Willoch government's departure. Does Carl I. Hagen now regret voting the way he did?

[Answer] Not at all! We simply acquiesced in Willoch's resignation.

[Question] Are you not worried that everybody subject to higher taxes in 1987 will "bill" the Progressive Party?

[Answer] No, why would they do that? People do know that the Progressive Party is opposed to higher taxes.

Furthermore, the Willoch government would have collapsed anyway. Everybody could see the big problems facing the three parties due to the decline in oil revenues. The three parties split while working on the revised national budget, as they did this time

during the national budget debate. Had Willoch wanted to stay, he could have come to us with a proposal to cut spending. But we did not hear a word....

### Cheap Politics

[Question] The Progressive Party was opposed to building Parliament garages and against a pay increase for politicians. Was this not "cheap" opposition politics to capture frustrated voters?

[Answer] Many politicians view voters as subjects. Politicians, however, are supposed to represent their voters. What we see here is a clear pattern: the matter of garages, politicians' pay, party support, parliamentary representatives' travel expenses and politicians' generous pension. This cannot be allowed to continue. Leaders must show the way by setting a good example.

The Progressive Party has been gaining in the polls. Hagen believes this to be due to the fact that the party's goals are better focused again. "Take public safety and the need for more law and order, for example. I feel that Minister of Justice Helen Bosterud is doing a good job in this area," said the Progressive Party leader. He feels that Bosterud is doing a better job than her predecessors in the Willoch government.

[Question] Which cabinet minister is Hagen the least satisfied with?

[Answer] Johan Jorgen Holst!

### Upcoming Local Elections

[Question] Well ahead of the last parliamentary election, the Progressive Party's goal was to win 15 parliamentary seats. It won two. What are Hagen's hopes with respect to the upcoming local elections in about 8 months?

[Answer] We hope to keep the mandates we now have, which is an ambitious goal. I admit that our expectations were too high going into the last parliamentary election. We learned from this experience.

[Question] Do you get discouraged with politics when all the proposals submitted by the Progressive Party never get majority support in Parliament?

[Answer] No, but we influence in terms of our presence. Remember too that it was the Progressive Party which submitted the proposal

to approve a private hospital in Mesnalien. The proposal may be adopted and this has created a great deal of excitement. In my opinion, this matter should be decided soon. The proposal was submitted 15 October and should have been put to a vote in November. We will see how it goes in January.

#### Nonsocialist Voters Feel Betrayed

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Dec 86 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] Irritation. Despair. Distrust. One hardly need polls to register voters' negative attitudes toward parties and politicians as 1986 draws to a close. The inability to make decisions and, above all, the inability to make the necessary decisions have created a deeper feeling that the government and Parliament are not equal to the task. Necessary cuts in the national budget are not being made, and taxes are going up at a time when special efforts should be encouraged, not penalized.

The despair is greatest among nonsocialist voters. First of all, they have seen a nonsocialist coalition government overthrown this year by a politically impossible constellation: the Labor Party, the Socialist Left Party (SV) and the Progressive Party. Secondly, they have seen the Christian People's Party and the Center Party part company with the Conservative Party--as well as part company with nonsocialist politics.

What the two middle companies are now doing is to keep the Labor Party in power. This is a fact. Non-binding statements to the effect that a three-party government is still part of the program are for now just empty phrases. In practice, the middle parties are now seeing to it that the country has a socialist government, which is gradually shifting political developments in a socialist direction. The adoption of higher taxes is just one of many examples.

Nonsocialist voters feel betrayed. They renewed the coalition government's mandate in 1985 when they voted for a nonsocialist majority in Parliament. They have the right to expect a government based on this majority. They have no reason to be satisfied with the fact that parties which went into the election as nonsocialist government parties are now supporting a socialist government.

There will be another election next September. If a new nonsocialist government is not in place by then, voters have every reason to abandon the parties responsible for it.

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CSO: 3639/7

**NONSOCIALIST PARTIES FACING INCREASINGLY STRONG BRUNDTLAND****Opposition Missed Autumn Opportunity**

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 20 Jan 87 p 4

[Editorial: "Inadequate Basis"]

[Text] As soon as the Center Party and the Christian People's Party commit themselves to pursuing conservative policy, Rolf Presthus will be ready to take over as the nation's prime minister. It is that simple--and that difficult.

We believe this is a reasonable interpretation of the discussions and resolutions that occurred at the annual Conservative Party congress in Oslo this weekend. A statement from the congress said that "a change in government will depend on the parties (the Conservatives, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party) arriving at a mutual basis for a nonsocialist policy that will enable them to agree on real limitations on public spending and a tax policy that stimulates achievement, among other things."

If we look back at the events in Storting last fall it seems obvious that this is exactly what the three former government parties were unable to agree on. The nonsocialists made great efforts to hammer out an alternative national budget and an economic plan that the three parties could unite behind. However once the two middle parties had freed themselves from the grip of the Conservatives, they were close to the Labor than to the Conservative policy.

We assume that this reality has provided a lesson that can be utilized in the months ahead too. We are thinking in particular of the debate we will soon have on the basis of the government's proposal for a new tax system. If we finally manage to clean up the tax jungle and create a fair tax system it is really only the Labor Party that can do that kind of job with the help of the middle parties.

The reason why we are excluding the Conservative Party already is that all experience has shown that in tax debates the Conservatives want to stand alone. In debates like this the Conservatives do not want to be like other people. Tax promises--no matter how airy they have been--have always been a

central issue for the Conservative Party. Therefore it is inconceivable that the Conservatives will join forces with other parties in shaping a tax system that can win the broadest possible political support.

In many ways it has been discouraging to follow the tax debate in the Conservative Party since the Tax Commission presented its proposals in 1984. The commission's proposal was unanimous, of course. The reason why people from the Progressive, Conservative and Labor parties, among others, were able to stand together on an important tax policy proposal was that the members of the commission were capable of seeing the difference between the tax system and the level of taxes. Although there will always be political disagreements about how high taxes should be, the commission showed that it is possible to arrive at a nonpartisan agreement on the system under which taxes are imposed.

It is natural to assume that the political agreement arrived at by the Tax Commission could also be transferred to political life outside the commission. But that was not the case. The Conservatives have consistently refused to go along with anything that resembles cooperation on the tax system. The Conservative member of the Tax Commission, bank director Sverre Walter Rostoft, has been a virtual stranger when it comes to the economic--and tax policy--debate in his own party.

We have little faith that a "common basis for nonsocialist policy" can be formed with respect to these important questions. Therefore we hope that the middle parties will recognize their responsibility and see the opportunity that is opening up to create a new and fairer tax system.

#### Brundtland Increasingly Dominating Party

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Morten Malmo: "Labor Party Intends to Stay in Power"]

[Text] Gro Harlem Brundtland's position in the Labor Party is stronger than it has ever been before.

The party has no wish to give up its government position. The question is how much the government will tolerate in the way of voting defeats.

The party headquarters in Youngstorvet has strengthened its position in the "Labor concern."

High interest rates are the party's biggest headache. The party congress in March is prepared to discuss both "Star Wars" and the demand for radical tax reform.

An active distribution policy will be the party's most important weapon in the election campaign.

When the government changed hands last May the mood in the Labor Party was high. The idyll was rudely disturbed by an untidy wage settlement. Those who

pushed through the change in power also discovered that the Willoch government's description of the economic problems and its warnings against overspending were well founded. It quickly became apparent that most of the Labor Party's many election promises (guarantees) would have to be locked away in desk drawers to await better times. However the disappointment this created was dispelled in the fall by the rejoicing over the nonsocialist collapse and a certain amount of progress in the opinion polls. The decline in the Market and Media Institute [MMI] county barometer was assigned little or no importance at party headquarters.

When the balance sheet is added up for last year party officials agree that in general more has been gained than lost by holding government power in a period when the nonsocialists were unable to unite on an alternative policy.

#### Remain in Office

"Our plans are based on the assumption that the government will remain in office until the 1990 election or at least until after the fall election this year," said party secretary Thorbjorn Jagland, who added: "When we see what has been accomplished, we have good reason to be satisfied."

#### Has there been enough Labor policy?

"We have got as much Labor policy out of running the government as possible," Jagland replied.

He did point out that the necessary austerity measures have been a burden on the government, but said he expects such measures to be met with increased understanding as time goes by.

"Now the spotlight must be focused on the problems of distribution and the government is working on its new tax proposal. Families with children must be given special consideration. And funds must be freed for innovation and growth," the party secretary stressed.

#### Satisfaction

The Labor Party Youth Organization [AUF] is also satisfied that the party is running the government. "If we were not, we would say so," said AUF leader Jens Stoltenberg. But he said it was "too bad" that the government had to abandon its original SMS proposal and the proposal for a progressive gross tax. He did find it a positive sign that in the budget debate the main emphasis was placed on revenue increases rather than spending cuts, that financing for studies was improved, that development aid was increased, that home financing rates were reduced and that commercialization of the helath system was halted.

However Stoltenberg is now calling for an improved distribution between generations, a radical tax reform that emphasizes limiting interest deductions and more Norwegian reservations in NATO based on the Labor Party program statement concerning the party's opposition to the development of space weapons.

## **Strong Position**

The head of the Labor Party, Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, has never had a stronger position in the party than she has now, just 2 months before she is up for re-election as party leader. This will undoubtedly be by standing ovation, accompanied by bouquets of red roses. She has authority in the party's Storting group as well as with the labor movement, in spite of the fact that she also has critics in the ranks of the latter group. Deputy leader Einar Forde is unlikely to be opposed for re-election and the same is true of the acting party secretary, Thorbjorn Jagland, who is now up for "official" election.

The government's members are also being weighed over coffee by the party's local groups. Most are critical of Aid Minister Vesla Vetlesen and Agriculture Minister Gunhild Oyangen. There is little personal criticism of "Interest Minister" Gunnar Berge, but there are those who feel he is too colorless.

Although there is satisfaction in party ranks that Norway has a Labor government, several party deputies would probably like clearer signals. It is expected that in the period before the congress and at the congress, party leaders will give clear signals about how the economic problems will be solved in the months ahead. "There is a need for clear marching orders," AFTENPOSTEN was told.

However several "small wars" are going on in the Labor Party system that could create complications and dampen the party leadership's good mood. Relations with parts of the union movement are not ideal. Defense Minister Holst has problems with the officers. Environmental Affairs Minister Sissel Ronbeck has fallen out with those who want to develop more power and the Mesnalien conflict has revealed differences of opinion between party leaders and the party's social politicians in Storting.

The fact that party secretary Jagland, Agriculture Minister Oyangen and Asbjorn Sjothun, head of the Storting Agricultural Committee, have had a public dispute over transfers to agriculture could also dilute the party's energy. This particular disagreement also demonstrates that party headquarters in Youngstorvet wants a bigger say. Jagland's predecessor, Ivar Leveraas, was cautious when he made political statements. Jagland is more of a "stump puller." "He could be the strongest party secretary in the Labor Party since Haakon Lie," people have said.

## **Nonsocialists Discuss Renewed Cooperation**

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Jan 87 p 5

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen: "Economy the Most Difficult Topic"]

[Text] The Conservatives, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party are preparing the ground for a new three-party government coalition. Things that might prove to be difficult to agree on are being discussed at meetings of the top leadership of the three parties. "In most areas there are no

insurmountable problems that would hinder a government formation," said Conservative chairman Rolf Presthus. But he admitted that economic policy is the thing it is hardest to reach agreement on.

Presthus added that there is increased understanding in the middle parties of the need for greater economic policy adjustment.

#### New Meetings

Rolf Presthus made these remarks at a press conference following the meeting of the Conservative Party's executive committee yesterday. The party chairman disclosed that there had been discussions among the former government parties before Christmas and that similar meetings were held after New Year's. "New meetings on the part of party chairmen and parliamentary leaders have been scheduled," the Conservative chairman said.

#### Impatience

The fact that he called these political talks and not government discussions does not alter the purpose of the meetings. They represent an attempt to create a mutual political platform for the formation of a new government. Presthus would not set any date for a government takeover, but he made it clear that it should happen as soon as possible in order to implement the measures that are needed to improve the nation's economy.

"There is impatience in the Conservative Party from one end of the country to the other to return to the ruling position. This is true both at the grass-roots level and in the top leadership," the party chairman stressed.

Asked if the three parties could take over now, Rolf Presthus made this reply:

"If Gro Harlem Brundtland steps down we are ready to take over. All three parties have indicated that."

Yesterday the Conservative Party was able to present its new outward image. The party's general secretary, Svein Gronnern had this to say about the new logo: "It symbolizes the content of the Conservative policy, the balance between freedom and responsibility. The abstract blue pennant represents freedom and future-oriented vision. The Conservative name in block letters indicates responsibility and the line under the name of the party ties the whole thing together firmly. The fact that the line is green is not due to a political change of course but the need to soften the logo with another color."

The Conservative Party's executive committee said in a resolution that they are worried about the effects the high interest level could have, especially for low-income groups and the business sector. The Conservative executive committee said that a foundation should be laid as soon as possible for a lower interest level via further economic policy adjustment. This could check wage and cost developments and lower our foreign trade deficit, they said.

The Conservatives feel that an important first step in preventing things like the Sjoli case in Rendalen from happening is to change the concession law so that the state cannot use its preemptive right to establish public ownership of farms and forests in this country.

#### Housing Assistance

To meet the needs of the financially weakest group among those seeking housing, the Conservative Party recommended tying housing subsidies to initial establishment to a larger extent. If society is going to redistribute housing assistance, consideration should be given to whether it is right to give people in a comfortable financial situation the same assistance that is given to low-income groups, the party said.

6578

CSO: 3639/18

POLITICAL

NORWAY

## SOCIALIST LEFT PARTY SEEN TO HAVE SOLVED LEADERSHIP IMPASSE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen: "Koritzinsky to Accept Reelection"]

[Text] There is much to indicate that neither Tora Houg nor Erik Solheim will be elected the top leader in the Socialist Left Party at the party's national meeting 2-5 April. Things are going rather toward a compromise solution in the leadership question: Theo Koritzinsky is said to be willing to continue as leader in a new two-year period if one of the deputy leaders is hired full time. In this case it would be Erik Solheim.

The above comes from well-informed sources in the Socialist Left Party. It was pointed out that this is the model the party's election committee is working for. If the plan works at the national meeting, a conflict on leadership will be avoided.

Theo Koritzinsky has previously said that he will step down as leader to have more time for Storting work, where he is particularly engaged in defense and foreign policy questions.

### Pressure

According to what AFTENPOSTEN has learned, Koritzinsky is said to be willing to continue if a full-time employed deputy leader can relieve him of the routine party work. It is clear that strong forces in the party are pressing Koritzinsky to achieve such a model.

### Houg and Solheim

After his signals that he would step down, Tora Houg and Erik Solheim stood out as strong candidates to take over.

Opponents of the former party secretary are skeptical that Solheim is critical of parts of the Social Left's policy.

Tora Houg's critics say that she stands too strongly planted in the traditional Socialist Left Party, and that the Storting representative does not represent the new thinking many are seeking in the Socialist Left Party. Houg, who is the

leader of the group working on the revision of the Socialist Left platform, has made it clear that she is willing to continue in the party leadership. At present she is the political organizational deputy leader.

In a chairmanship struggle between Solheim and Houg at the national meeting in April, it is difficult to predict who would come out the victor. Many in the Socialist Left point out to AFTENPOSTEN that Erik Solheim can dedicate all his time to the party apparatus, because unlike Koritzinsky and Houg he is not a Storting representative.

The Socialist Left's strongest card, Storting group leader Hanna Kvanmo, is in her last Storting term. It is no secret that one has in the Socialist Left Party asked her to take a new term and to seek party leadership.

Bu Hann Kvanmo has declined. She has manned the barricades for 20 years, and after this she has been in the Storting for 16 years. Long days and many trips. She has done her time. She makes fun of having been asked about becoming party leader in this way: "Then I would have been kicked upstairs to incapability and reached my level of incompetence."

912<sup>4</sup>  
CSO: 3639/14

## ASSIMILATION OF MUSLIMS IN USSR REPORTED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 8 Oct 86 p 12

[Text] Reports indicate that the Soviet administration is about to engage in another attempt (since Stalin) at forced assimilation directed at Turkish-Muslim republics within its borders. It is said that Moscow had entrusted KGB with major responsibilities regarding this operation.

Feeling apprehensive over population increases in Turkish-Muslim republics, Gorbachev and the new leaders of the Soviet Communist Party have given the green light to KGB for a Russification campaign. According to information gathered from various sources, in the 6 republics where Turkish-Muslims constitute the majority local KGB directors are almost all ethnic Russians. Though Moscow is known to appoint ethnic Turks and Muslims as secretaries general of the Communist Party in places like Azerbaijan and Kirghizistan, when it comes to the KGB they go with the Russians, just as it was under the Tsars. In any case, the no. 2 spot in the party is also the usual preserve of the Russians.

Sources say that of the 6 republics with Muslim majorities in only one the local KGB director happens to be Turkish, and that is in Azerbaijan. Named Z.M. Yusufzade, this Azeri KGB chief is known for his suppression of Turkish identity and Islam in that country. The directors of KGB in the other 5 republics are all ethnic Russians: Z. Kamelidenov in Kazakhstan (since 15 Feb 82), N.P. Lomov in Kirghizistan (since 78), Victor Golovin in Uzbekistan (since 31 Aug 83), Perventsev in Turkestan (since 75), and Baykov in the Autonomous Republic of Turkmenistan (since 79).

#### Islam Suppressed

In Turkish and Muslim republics KGB's activities are almost wholly focused on internal matters. Their major responsibilities include:

Monitoring readers of Koran and the 'black market' in Koran copies, maintaining agents at mosques and dispersing secret religious gatherings held in religious establishments, penetrating into Islamic sects -- particularly the Yesevi sect

widespread in Turkestan, and the Naqshibendi sect in the Caucasus region; and preventing contacts between Muslim coming in from Afghanistan and the local Turks.

KGB officials working in Turkic regions engage in atheistic propaganda, and to prevent the youth, in particular, from showing any interest in Islam. KGB headquarters sends its most competent agents to these regions -- agents who know the Turkish and Muslim world extremely well.

Haidar Aliyev (who had been the KGB chief in Azerbaijan and whose star had been rising during the Brezhnev era) and Eduard Shevardnadze are the Politburo members behind the campaign against the Turks. Aliyev is engaged in a ruse whereby he has promoted the proliferation of Turkish identity inside Iranian Azerbaijan through reliable agents (thus enticing Iranian Azerbaijan to join the Soviet Azerbaijan) while commissioning exactly the opposite in Soviet Azerbaijan and other Muslim republics. Having reinforced the atheistic propaganda among his own ethnic group and coreligionists, Aliyev keeps harping on the theme, "We are Soviets. The Soviet Communist Party is our guiding light."

#### The Sun That is Russia

It is Shevardnadze, known for his antipathy towards the Turks, who is at the forefront of the new campaign. (He was made foreign minister by Gorbachev.) It is said that Shevardnadze, when he was secretary general of the Georgian Communist Party, was engaged in oppressing his own nation much like his compatriot Stalin. Despite his Georgian origins, we hear Shevardnadze utter the following words from the podium at the 25th congress of the CPSU in 76:

Comrades, Georgia is known as the land of the sun. But for us the real sun does not rise from the east but has risen from the north. I am referring to the sun that is Russia. This is the sun which derives its light from the ideas of Lenin.

12466  
CSO: 3554/90

## TCP IMPACT ON COMMUNIST ASSIMILATION IN BULGARIA

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 8 Oct 86 p 2

[Commentary by Mehmet Cavus, chairman of The Balkan Turks Culture and Solidarity Association]

[Text] It is difficult not to be struck by the analogy between those who subscribe to the 'Moscow model' communism and 'free riders' in a hunting expedition who lie in wait for wounded animals shot by other hunters. Latelv, the representatives of the illegal Turkish Communist Party (TCP) are demonstrating such an instance. Issuing calls for 'revolutionary activity' to the people and invoking their jargon of 'oppression', 'injustice', 'exploitation', 'inequality' and so on, these are all beginning to taste like stale bread. For them, any country which is not socialist or communist leads its working class to the edge of the precipice, and the only solution to this is 'war', 'revolution', 'fire', and 'blood'. They issue calls to the people to fight, while they themselves head for the tall grass, lying in wait for the 'wounded animals' as in the hunting analogy. That is, after all, what they have learnt from their masters. Lenin, for instance, in his writings, invited the working class to civil war while immersing himself in a life of pleasure far away from Russia. Georgi Dimitrov in Bulgaria did the same.

Communists have never regarded the interests of workers and peasants as their own. They regarded them as material and moral instruments of their own selfish interests. Having sent them to their death, what they subsequently built is a system of 'equality in poverty'. In fact, a regime that proposes material and moral equality is nothing but an illusion. Communism has created an impasse over this illusion. Recent history is full of instances of this. The 'militants' of TCP should know how many intelligent people have been banished to prisons and concentration camps just because they opposed this illusion, and how many have perished in the steppes of Russia as depicted in 'Cancer Ward'. Clear instances of these have also been witnessed in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries.

Having heard enough of their 'calls to action' I want to ask the blind-folded leaders of the TCP what they have in store once the revolution is accomplished. Are they intent upon turning Great Turkey into a Hungary, a Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Bulgaria where life has been paralyzed? They themselves must be fully aware that the regime they espouse is the one depicted in 'Cancer Ward'. Otherwise why should they be carrying on their activities in capitalist countries, or the so-called 'unjust and unfair' countries 'rife with exploitation'? How strange it all is!

### Incidents in Bulgaria

For TCP, fairness and justice can be established only when a socialist regime is put in place following 'revolutionary action'. If they were realistic and for justice and for the people as they profess to be, before they had anything to do with Turkey, they would have pondered about the fate of 2 million Bulgarian Turks, 1 million Pomak Turks; the Kipti, Albanian, Tatar and Muslim communities totalling 1 million, and would have come forward in their defense. I would advise the TCP leaders, who seem to walk through life with closed eyes, to go to Bulgaria and see, at close quarters, the genocide of Turks, the blood-curdling tortures that recall the Inquisition, the barbarisms, the obliteration of customs and mores, the banishing of people to prisons and concentration camps simply for speaking in their mother tongue, the monstrous destruction of mosques and cemeteries, the cruelties experienced by the 4-million strong Muslim-Turkish community. They should then turn and issue the call to 'revolutionary action' to those oppressed under socialism.

They should know full well that despite their communist credentials they won't be allowed anywhere near the Turkish regions of Bulgaria. For them, the important thing is not listening to the cries of anguish of the 4 million, but living it up with wine, women and song in touristic spots like Sofia, Varna and Burgas. The important thing for them is maintaining the facade of socialism-communism, without having the faintest idea of what 'revolutionary action' is all about. For the deaf-mutes of the TCP, being deprived of things like language, religion, national honor, weddings and festivals, schools, and prayer have never meant anything in any case. The only show in town for them is wrapping themselves in the flag of justice while adding fuel to anarchism, aggravating strife, whipping up ambitions, and taking a back seat and watching what is happening. They know full well that unless they don't fall into line with Moscow's directives, their wallets, their stomachs as well as their beds would remain empty. To that end they have been trained in 'fanaticism' and learned how to behave like parrots. These degenerate, obsessive anarchists for hire are the blemish of mankind, apart from being dangerous creatures. Their whole demeanor is evidence of that.

**SYRIAN MINISTER'S COMMENTS ON EXPECTING TURKISH SUPPORT REPORTED**

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 16 Nov 86 p 7

[Togay Bayatli report]

[Text] Damascus—Syrian Minister of Information Yassin Rajjuh, one of that country's most powerful men, said in a statement to MILLIYET yesterday that his country places major importance on its relations with Turkey and added: "We expect our friends to be on our side with respect to moves undertaken by Western countries against us."

In his remarks, Rajjuh first spoke about the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt and said: "Countries which condone that agreement cannot be our friends." He continued: "They want to embroil us in certain incidents. We cannot consent to that. We were forced into this affair; we are not in any way connected." Rajjuh said the following about Nezar Hindawi who placed a bomb into his girlfriend's bag at London's airport:

"Hindawi's father and elder brother trade with Israel. Both of them are barred from entering Jordan. How could they be working for us?"

With regard to rumors that Britain may stage an attack, Rajjuh said: "Let them come whenever they want. We are ready. We will teach them the necessary lesson."

With regard to reports in the Western press that there are shortages in Syria, Rajjuh said: "They are doing all they can to make us look bad; they are trying to disseminate fallacies."

**Punitive Sanctions**

Successive punitive sanctions imposed by the United States against Syria were greeted with anger in Damascus.

Jibran Koriyah, President Hafiz al-Assad's spokesman, said that the United States has embarked on a new "aggression" and "provocation" campaign against Syria.

Koriyah interpreted the U.S. decision to impose sanctions as "a move to coerce Syria to abandon its stance of opposition against the Camp David agreement" and insisted that "desperate Israeli and British pressuring tactics are at the root of the events."

The Syrian spokesman said that the U.S. sanctions and their effects on relations between the two countries are being evaluated.

The Syrian radio and television reported that the government is considering steps against the United States, but did not specify what these steps might be.

The Reagan administration expressed "indignation" about Syrian complicity in international terrorist incidents and decided to impose certain diplomatic and economic sanctions against Damascus.

9588  
CSO: 3554/119

## PLO REPRESENTATIVE ON MESSAGE FROM ARAFAT

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 16 Nov 86 p 14

[Text] In response to developments in Turkey, PLO leader Yasir Arafat sent handwritten messages PLO representative Abu Firas cautioning him "not to be tricked."

Our columnist, Mumtaz Soysal, spoke with Abu Firas who has become a "target man" in Ankara.

## A Grand Israeli Plot?

The issue that disturbs Abu Firas most among the incidents, rumors and comments that have occupied the Turkish public for the last week is the allegation that he is not on good terms with the PLO leader. He said: "I am here as the special envoy and official representative of my brother leader Arafat. I am also the official representative of the PLO." He added:

"Ties between myself and our leader are not strained as enemy sources claim. Those ties are so firm and strong that they would not be affected by any set of circumstances."

The truth is that Abu Firas is not an inconsequential person who can be easily dismissed within the PLO. Before being named to his position in Ankara, he was the chief counselor of the organization's foreign affairs spokesman.

Abu Firas now keeps constant and close contact with Arafat. In one corner of his office he has a latest model fax machine. He said: "This device is secure against any outside tampering or bugging. No one from the outside can monitor this direct communication between myself and Arafat."

During our first meeting in midweek, we read a message that had just come through the fax machine in Abu Firas' office whose doors are operated electrically and which is protected inside and outside by special guard squads. The message contained handwritten instructions by Arafat to Abu Firas: "My dear brother: Please keep your calm in the face of all the attacks and accusations. What is important for us is to maintain our strong relations with our Turkish brothers. This brotherhood must not be damaged even at the expense of a Palestinian killed by torture. Let us not be tricked by the

intrigues of those who want to create a rift between Turks and Arabs. So far we have given thousands of martyrs for the Palestinian cause. What difference does one more martyr make?"

In the weekend, a second handwritten note from Arafat emerged from the fax machine. It said: "Probe deeper into the character of Rafet Saban who is pitting our Turkish brothers against us, who has created confusion among the Arab missions in Ankara and who is helping the Israeli cause with his actions."

Abu Firas is not an inconsequential person not only within the PLO but also in Ankara. He is the most senior Arab diplomatic representative in Ankara; in official language, he is "the doyen of the Arab envoys." When necessary he represents all Arab envoys. Not surprisingly, our midweek conversation with him was frequently interrupted by phone calls from those envoys. All of them were anxious to learn what was happening and to gauge accurately the turbulence in the press and official circles. Among the Arab envoys, Abu Firas is the best observer and analyzer of the Turkish press, and he keeps other Arab missions abreast of the developments.

Asked about the charges leveled against him and allegations that he is "Abu Nidal's man," Abu Firas replied: "These illiterates apparently do not know who Abu Firas is. I am one of the leading targets of the murderous Abu Nidal group and the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad. I am not someone who would be provoked by foolish and ignorant accusations leveled by illiterates. The strong foundations of our relations with Turkey cannot be destroyed by such a passing storm. Where were these people during the past 7 years I have spent in brotherly Turkey?"

This is the issue which concerns the Arab embassies in Ankara most. Why did this storm grow so rapidly and why is everyone in Turkey--particularly the officials of overt and covert agencies--so bitterly divided over the issue?

It is clear that Abu Firas' reaction to rumors that a Palestinian student had been killed by torture set in motion an almost planned and organized storm which exceeds the proportions of the incident by several orders of magnitude and which has exposed behind-the-scenes expectations.

Abu Firas' initial reaction can be considered normal. Upon hearing that one of his nationals was killed by torture, he asked for information from the authorities, and he waited for a lengthy period--nearly a month--for the information. What caused him "to explode" without waiting a little longer and created a mind-boggling confusion pitting Turks, Palestinians and Jordanians against each other was a Jordanian citizen of Palestinian origin named Rafet Saban. After hesitating for a lengthy period, Abu Firas decided to listen to this young man after taking all necessary precautions.

Pointing to a small recording instrument in his hand, Abu Firas said: "Saban spoke unaware that we had placed this device under that chair. You can listen and see that there is no uneasiness or fear in his voice." Indeed, the recording played back by the tiny device did not appear to be the voice of a man who was speaking with a gun pointed to his head, but the conversation of a person talking calmly in a chatting mood.

However, it seems that everything happened after that incident. Saban gave differing accounts to the PLO, the Jordanian embassy, which he visited later on, and the Turkish authorities with whom he was in contact.

And he managed to pit all of them against each other.

We do not know where he is or what he is doing now. Is it possible that he was a Mossad agent assigned to create a rift between Turks and Arabs or between the PLO and Abu Firas, who is very well liked in Turkey, at a time when confusing winds are blowing in the Middle East and preparations are under way for the Islamic summit?

Moreover, it was Saban who claimed that Emeri--who was later found out to be working for the Islamic Jihad organization and involved in murky relations--was a Mossad agent.

Perhaps it was also Saban who fabricated the story of death by torture.

Over the entire week, Abu Firas went over these unclarified points carefully. He said: "I have only one wish. I wish the true murderers of Jordanian diplomat Ziad Sati could be found. Those murderers are the same criminals who are after us." Abu Firas says he is prepared to do everything, including bringing his own nephew to trial or to submit his tape recording to the court, in order to have the murderers caught. He added: "So long as the investigation proceeds by legal channels without predeclaring the defendants to be guilty."

When you see the security measures around him, you get a better idea of what he means when he says: "Those murderers are after us." Since disclosing the Rafet Saban incident Abu Firas has received at least ten phone calls threatening to kill him. On one occasion, his Turkish wife, whom he married in Ankara and who is not accustomed to such threats, was so scared that she passed out. During our second conversation yesterday she seemed to have recovered and was smiling as she always does.

Abu Firas said that the callers threatened: "You will pay heavily for what you have done." He added: "Apparently, the price they are talking about is creating a rift between myself and Turks whom I like very much. This is the price I would be most unwilling to pay."

During our conversation I asked Abu Firas to evaluate the general situation of the last few weeks. He said:

"At the moment, the PLO's relations with Syria are not good. However, I cannot disregard the following fact: America was really preparing to do something against Syria." According to Abu Firas, French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac's statement to the effect that "the bomb incident in London and similar terror activities are plots staged by Mossad," upset U.S. plans for intervention at the last minute. He added: "Now it is more likely that internal unrest will be stirred in Syria and the Syrian regime will be forced to accept a larger Soviet military presence in order to defend its position."

According to the PLO representative, such a situation would create a suitable climate for the United States to make its presence felt in the region and to force certain countries to accept the "Rapid Deployment Force." He said: "Unfortunately, the Soviets are about to fall into this trap."

For a Palestinian who has grown up in the intrigues of the Middle East, it is apparently not too difficult to see through and to expose these "convoluted plots." According to Abu Firas, PLO leader Arafat discussed these plots during his recent meeting with Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglu in Jiddah and asked that Turkey not become the tool of those who want to create a rift between the PLO and Turkey by using the initial reaction of Abu Firas as a pretext. Farouk Kaddoumi, the head of the PLO's Political Bureau--in a sense the "foreign minister" of the organization--stressed the same point in his 10 November 1986 note sent to Turkey through the Turkish embassy in Tunisia.

In our last conversation, Abu Firas' mood appeared to have improved. He felt comforted by the fact that the Prime Minister had taken control of the situation after his return from his Far East tour and had created the impression of a Turkey "which is not easily tricked" by restoring previously missing harmony among the various agencies of the Turkish government.

9588  
CSO: 3554/119

## GOVERNMENT URGED TO BE MORE ENERGETIC IN IRAN PROBLEMS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 5 Nov 86 p 4

[Article by Professor Fahir Armaoglu]

[Text] It must be admitted that lately we have an issue called Iran, and increasingly so. The issue has surfaced not so much as a foreign policy problem but an internal one. It might sound contradictory but Iran's becoming an internal problem is most likely due to 'foreign' meddling in our affairs. What I want to say is that the issue does not stem solely from Iran.

In our opinion, Iran's becoming an 'issue' (or at the very last an 'item on the agenda') has its beginnings in the 15 Aug operation conducted by the Turkish army into Iraqi territory, to deal a heavy blow to separatist bandits. In the wake of this operation the 'Kerkuk' problem was brought to the headlines, particularly by sources overseas. As debates over Kerkuk continued claims were made that all this was a 'scenario' contrived by the Americans. That 'scenario' is still under discussion today.

Iran's subsequent behavior did nothing to quell speculations either. During the Iranian offensive which started on 1 Sep a rumor spread that Iran had destroyed the Kerkuk oil refinery. Though it turned out to be false the rumor led to certain controversies and disagreements between Turkey and Iran, whether we would like to admit it or not. These centered on the question, 'If Iran takes Kerkuk what would Turkey do?' Given Turkey's 'neutrality' in the war, such speculations hardly enhance the state of Turkish-Iran relations.

Things were at this stage a pro-Shah Iranian colonel residing in Istanbul was assassinated by the agents of Khomeini. This and the rather curious declaration by a Shah supporter that he will conduct his struggle against Khomeini inside Turkey was sufficient to turn Iran into an internal issue for Turkey. Even the prime minister, who was on tour at the time, reacted with well-founded indignation against such declarations.

One suspects, however, that even the authorities do not have a clear count of the numbers of Iranians seeking refuge in Turkey. The number is likely to be in the tens of thousands or more. And it doesn't appear as if Turkish security officials can monitor them adequately. It cannot be doubted that there are agents of the Iranian government among Iranians living in Turkey. The obvious difficulty of monitoring every single Iranian makes it easy for both sides -- the agents of Teheran and the Shah supporters -- to conduct their feuds unfettered. It may even be preferable for them to settle their scores right here in Turkey, so near Iran, rather than in Paris, New York or Germany.

Furthermore, it won't be farfetched to say that certain Western countries which are against the Khomeini regime and intent upon toppling it, are trying to take advantage of this turmoil. With the introduction of these 'external' factors into the equation, it is safe to say that the 'Iran issue' is fast becoming an intractable and complicated problem for Turkey. Therefore, the Turkish government needs to take much more energetic measures than it has up to now.

12466  
CSO: 3554/77

## IMPACT OF CHANGING WORLD CONFIGURATION

## Domestic Patterns Shifting

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 16 Nov 86 pp 8,14

[*"From Metin Toker's Notebook" column by Metin Toker: "A New Tradition Is Born: Dialog in Political Life"*]

[Text] It was inevitable that the by-elections would cause a stir in the political arena, particularly since the outcome was unexpected. The end of this turbulence and the restoration of normalcy occurred just in time.

It is now clear that the Turkish Grand National Assembly [TGNA] does not nurture the absurd belief and disposition that a "Turkey without bans" can be realized simply by repealing Provisional Article 4 of the Constitution. The Social Democratic Populist Party [SDPP], which knows that its status of being a social democratic main opposition party "ties its hands," tried that and sought signatures for a petition demanding such a constitutional amendment. However, not even the SDPP's assembly group unanimously supported that move. Only the assembly group of the Correct Way Party [CWP] unanimously signed the petition; they were also joined by a few independent assembly deputies. The entire Free Democratic Party [FDP] assembly group declined to sign it and the five-member Democratic Left Party [DLP] group remained noncommittal by saying "we will support it if you can get 129 votes."

The proposal has not only failed to win 267 votes to become law, it has not even received the 134 votes needed to submit it to the TGNA. This is not surprising: Simple arithmetic shows that without the backing of the Motherland Party [MP] Provisional Article 4 cannot be repealed. This state of affairs proves the sheer fallacy of the statement: "We already have 100 men in the MP assembly group. They are all waiting for a sign from Mr Suleyman [Demirel]." This has also changed the climate that prevailed in assembly anterooms and especially among MP ranks immediately after the by-elections. Neither "something is happening" nor "is something going to happen." Because the formula of "changing the Constitution through adding amendments to Article 175"—a move that Ozal has shelved for the moment—is also opposed by the same simple arithmetic: It is impossible to win 301 votes in the TGNA against the inevitable opposition of the SDPP and the adamant resistance of the President.

That file will remain shelved until a new equation is established in the TGNA.

The by-elections also caused a stir within the SDPP. The turbulence within the SDPP will always continue. SDPP members now have to fight to become parliamentary candidates, unlike the members of the party's assembly group—"inherited from the Populist Party"—who did not have to compete at all. Those days are gone and will never come back. Today, only SDPP members who can appeal to voters have a chance of becoming parliamentary candidates regardless of their current status.

Those who think that they can find easy candidacy slots in other parties which have been making generous offers today instead of trying to win support within the SDPP know in their hearts that they may lose what they have while trying to get something bigger. It would be naive and wildly optimistic to expect that one could bypass Demirel's inner circle--virtually all former Justice Party [JP] deputies--his outer circle--virtually all JP organization leaders--the CWP senior administrators and the existing CWP assembly deputies and readily win a candidacy slot on the CWP ticket for a few days of service.

Winning a candidacy slot is as difficult in the CWP as it is in the SDPP.

That leaves the DLP. In that party, winning a candidacy slot is easy. But how can one turn his candidacy into an assembly seat with the support of a party which could not clear the 10-percent threshold even in the most favorable conditions of the by-elections?

All these facts have calmed down the turbulence within the SDPP to normal levels.

Thus the confusion of the by-elections has been overcome, and normalcy has returned to political life. A new and pleasing characteristic of this return to normalcy is that it has started with a government-main opposition dialog which gives the impression that it will be lasting and permanent.

Such a dialog does not bind the two sides in any democracy. The government declares its stance, and the opposition gives cautionary advice. When the prime minister and the main opposition leader part each other's company to meet again, they pursue their own courses. Still, the exercise is beneficial. The government does not waste its time and energy in knocking on closed doors, it does not commit itself to unnecessary obligations and it can make use of the warnings that it finds reasonable. Meanwhile, the opposition does not make errors of judgment resulting from a lack of information, it can level knowledgeable criticism, and it does not resort to demagogery. Some time later, the two sides meet again behind closed doors.

What inspires hope in the present arrangement is that the heads of the government and the main opposition appear for the first time to have characters "which will not disrespect the lowest common denominators of the dialog process." That is why it is highly appropriate that Turgut Ozal should be concerned about not changing the present arrangement from the status of a government-opposition dialog and degenerating it into something else. Parties

which have assembly groups—and even those which do not—have proposed to participate in that dialog in order to win some prestige for themselves. Ozal has politely but firmly turned that proposal down. The prime minister may talk to these parties if he deems it necessary but that has nothing to do with an institutionalized government-opposition dialog.

The President has similarly turned down proposals for turning "customary talks" with opposition parties in the assembly into a "round table conference."

The [FDP] group headed by Mehmet Yazar is on the verge of disintegrating. However, what will happen if [CWP leader] Husamettin Cindoruk declares after a summit meeting between leaders: "We have reached an identity of views that the Middle East problem cannot be resolved before Demirel's political rights are restored"? Was it not Cindoruk who said after a private meeting with the President that "the President has offered to act as an arbiter if the MP does not change its position on the issue of political bans"?

This is another example that demonstrates that people must be careful even when selecting a "custodian." That is why the renowned "Custodian Princess" of Istanbul is still remembered today.

Why was the ending of the inevitable political turbulence caused by the by-elections and the restoration of normalcy so timely? Because the situation that has arisen in the Middle East is such that, Turkey must think and determine its stance seriously and carefully with its government and opposition, following the maxim "two hands for one head." It is pleasing to see that there is a similarity of views between the two sides on this issue.

#### Armed Forces Key to World Position

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 17 Nov 86 pp 8,13

[ "From Metin Toker's Notebook" column by Metin Toker: "Turkey and The New Situation in the Middle East" ]

[Text] Reason as well as general rules of thumb require that a country go through three stages to determine its stance and attitude in foreign policy.. First you need reliable information. Then you must be able to make correct diagnoses on the basis of that information. Only then can you take realistic and appropriate measures.

If you tried to apply common sense and general rules of thumb to today's Middle East you would at first be dumbfounded. If the secretaries of state and defense of the United States are only now learning that their country has been holding secret talks with Iran for the last 18 months and that it has been trying to secure the release of its hostages by secretly selling arms and spare parts to Tehran, then where can you get "reliable information" from? Moreover, conflicting statements--a euphemism for "lies"--are continuing. Responding to press reports on the issue, President Reagan put on a dramatic expression befitting a former Hollywood actor and issued a statement from the White House. He said that the arms and spare parts sent to Iran "would barely

fill a cargo plane." In contrast, Danish shipping agents who were charged with transporting the arms are talking about shiploads of materiel. On the Iranian side, while Iran's President said "we have not bought anything from the Satan (that is America)," the Iranian delegate to the UN said: "The United States sold us arms and military supplies but that had nothing to do with the hostages." President Reagan has insisted that there was no bargaining over the hostages and that the purpose of the secret negotiations that were conducted during the last 18 months and the arms shipments was to "establish better relations with the Iranian administration that will take over after Khomeini."

During those 18 months, Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger had repeatedly warned U.S. allies about not selling arms and military supplies to Iran.

The saddest of the bargaining talks over American and French hostages in the Middle East was over the head of Peter Kilburn, the librarian of the American University of Beirut. Kilburn had been kidnaped not by a political group but by a gang demanding ransom. While negotiations between that gang and the United States continued, a pro-Libyan group learned that the United States was preparing to launch an attack against Libya and bought Kilburn. After the American strike against Libya, the bodies of Kilburn and two British nationals were found in Beirut "as Libyan reprisal against that strike."

Relations between France and Syria are no less complicated. The two French hostages most recently released in fact gained their freedom through Iranian mediation. But since Iran believes that "Syria should take the credit because at the moment it is in a more difficult position vis a vis the Europeans," the two hostages were delivered to the French in Damascus. That prompted a message of thanks from Quai d'Orsay to the Syrian government. Thus, the French exonerated Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad who was accused by Britain, partially convicted by the EEC and reportedly faced punishment at America's hands."

Why? French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac responded to that half-explicitly in a newspaper interview which caused a great deal of controversy. Ever since the Crusades, France has considered itself the protector of the Christians in the Middle East and has deep roots in Lebanon. Paris wants to preserve these roots and its status of protector even though they do no mean much at present. On the other hand, one cannot engage in politics in that region without taking the "Syrian factor" into account. Therefore, Chirac has to watch Hafiz al-Assad.

This is the new situation in the Middle East. Who can obtain reliable information and from where? From intelligence services?

Do not make Monsieur Chirac laugh. According to the French Prime Minister, even the U.S. and French intelligence services, let alone ours, have been penetrated, and these services are worthless except in times of war.

Therefore, given the new situation in the Middle East, Turkey must put aside both common sense and rules of thumb in the determination of its stance and attitude.

The guiding idea must be to determine what Turkey's permanent national interest is in the region "under all circumstances."

That interest is the implementation of a careful policy by Ankara which will not permit or create opportunities for the direct or indirect entanglement of the Turkish armed forces in Middle Eastern events. It is comforting to know that the government and the main opposition were in full agreement over this issue in their summit meetings.

Are there really "bogeymen" trying to embroil Turkey in Middle Eastern problems, and, if so, are they strong enough to accomplish what they want? This is an impression that our cryptos have untiringly tried to create in the public's mind for many years. According to the popular press, we might participate in the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, or we might be charged with acting as America's policeman in the Persian Gulf. Now, it appears that they want to use us in "a move against Syria or Iran."

One can have nothing but praise for our cryptos if they have figured out who is going to organize an operation against Syria and who is going to use us against Iran in the current situation in the Middle East and in the midst of all the multiple layers of intrigue.

But they already have a "bogeyman": the Americano-Zionists.

Turkey has no shortage of other ambitions. For example: "We can send our armed forces to Kirkuk, just like they intervened in Cyprus, and we can take the oil fields of Mosul. We can enter Syria and annex Aleppo to Hatay. In fact, if Papandreou makes us too angry, we can invade the best islands in the Aegean."

Such remarks bring no harm, and indeed are beneficial, as long as they are not uttered by those who have government or opposition responsibilities. Because similar fiery talk has been heard from the countries in question with reference to Turkey. We also know that embroiling Turkey in the Middle East is examined and researched as an option in American "think tanks" such as the Rand Corporation in California.

These hot-air balloons on both sides balance each other out.

As long as such remarks do not appear to have the backing of either the Turkish government or opposition, Turkey's position, stance and attitude does not change. In any case, the government-main opposition dialog, whose start is pleasing and comforting, can swiftly dispel such an appearance.

9588  
CSO: 3554/117

**SAHINKAYA CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROPOSAL READIED**

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 5 Oct 86 pp 1, 8

[Text] The petition for a parliamentary inquiry concerning Tahsin Sahinkaya has been presented to the SPP caucus in the Assembly. The petition bearing 23 signatures was submitted by a group led by Adana deputy Cuneyt Canver, chairman of the Improprieties Investigation Commission and SPP Central Committee Executive Council member. Expected to be heard in the General Assembly some time next week, the petition demands certain allegations to be investigated. These range from "deriving personal gain out of airplane purchases (to) becoming shareholder in four large companies through improper use of official position, favoring a certain company in all construction jobs contracted out by the Air Force, engaging in similar favoritism in awarding contracts for the furnishing of Air Force facilities thereby deriving undue benefit."

Apart from Canver petition contains signatures of SPP deputies M. Kani Burke, H. Avni Guler, Fikri Saglar, Salih Alcan, Ibrahim Tasdemir, M. Kemal Paloglu, H. Avni Sagesen, Munir Sevinc, Edip Ozgenc, Arif Toprak, Mehmet Kara, Muhittin Yildirim, Halil Nusret Goral, Besim Gocer, Kenan Nehrozoglu, Ali Riza Akaydin, H. Ibrahim Sahin, Yilmaz Demir, Seyhmuz Bahceci, Tevfik Bilal, Seyfi Oktay and independent Ali Ihsan Elgin.

The petition demands that an Assembly investigation or inquiry be undertaken with regard to allegations concerning Sahinkaya in accordance with Article 38 of the Constitution and clauses 102 and 103 of the Assembly internal code. There is a 3-page preamble to the petition where it is pointed out that since 12 Sep the country has lived through a period of unaccountability. Now that we are faced with allegations of impropriety the situation has changed, requiring close scrutiny of that period. In the preamble, the 12 Sep period is characterized as a "whirlwind of pecuniary interests," and following argument is made:

The early 80's was a time when terrorism was rooted out but also a time when economic anarchy was created. It was a time when

fortunes were made and lost, huge wealth and bankruptcy went hand in hand side sometimes proliferating as in a chain explosion. While many irregularities were discovered they could not be commented upon or made public. Among the names mentioned frequently in this regard is that of Mr. Sahinkaya.

#### Bribery Allegations over F-16s

The petition goes on:

Allegations concerning Mr. Sahinkaya range from receiving bribes from General Dynamics during the procurement of F-16 planes to the improper use of his office as Air Force commander favoring certain firms in tenders and procurement contracts, acquisition of properties (moveables and immovables) financed by the proceeds of illegal gain, and maintaining secret bank accounts overseas.

It is widely known that Mr. Sahinkaya and some of his relatives maintain partnerships with certain well-known companies. Mr. Sahinkaya, his wife and children hold shares in Kalebodur, Kalerterasit and Bagfas. Mrs. Sahinkaya is a founding shareholder of Iskur which was later bought by Bagfas from the Maritime Bank. Mr. Sahinkaya has had close relations with business circles for some time. As it so happens, when allegations concerning him first surfaced, it was the chairman of Kalebodur and then chairman of Kayalar who defended him in public. The first company is one in which Mr. Sahinkaya and relatives hold shares, while the latter is the company which is known to have received most of the contracts tendered by the Air Force Command.

With the intensification of relations between senior-ranking officers and business circles lately, authority for issuing large contracts and making major purchases has been shifted from the Forces commands to the Ministry of Defense. But it could be somewhat late in the day. A good number of senior officers who served at highest echelons are now spending their retirement sitting on the boards of well-known holding companies.

In the preamble reference is also made to rumors that an investigation, if authorized by the Assembly, may not be welcomed by the Armed Forces. On the contrary, the preamble maintains, the Armed Forces would be only too happy with such an investigation because "the strong traditions of the Turkish Air Force would demand that if there are improprieties they should be made public, thus putting an end to the rumors. No one can cover-up these allegations by sheltering behind 12 Sep."

The preamble also underlines the point that this is the first parliament convened after 12 Sep, and as deputies who had to submit to ratification by the National Security Council they

bear extra responsibility. And that is, "whether the NSC holds a mortgage over us or not."

In the concluding section of the preamble it is said:

Mr. Sahinkaya has personally declared his properties to include 4 apartments, 4 lots, and 1 summer cottage. According to our investigations he has also disposed of 1 yacht, 3 apartments, 2 lots and 1 car. Is it possible to own so much property with an officer's salary? That question should receive an answer.

12466  
CSO: 3554/77

**CALL FOR FULL RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY**

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 31 Oct, 4 Nov 86 p 9

[Articles by Yilmaz Oztuna]

[31 Oct 86 p 9]

[Text] As a nation we don't like certain things. And that we don't like we like to forget. This habit of ours can and does lead us into impasses of ever larger dimensions.

One of the important events in the history of the Turkish Republic is 12 Sep and its underlying causes. I don't think that is in any dispute. Nobody says 12 Sep was a minor event of no significance. Even for the relativism of interpretation there must be some limit.

The army did its duty on 12 Sep. It could have done it within the bounds of martial administration but it didn't. And the fact that the presidency went unfilled for 7 months should not be too exaggerated. At the time, the office was largely ceremonial. There are those who attribute some importance to the 'unfilled presidency' theory. Well, every view deserves a hearing. Particularly if the views are of those who played major roles in shaping the country's future.

The army won a great success in 12 Sep. It saved the state and the nation. If we forget this we might yet see our children felled in streets one by one. Not only democracy but even our state and independence may be endangered. This also is an opinion. There may be those for and against it. But the idea that must be absolutely avoided is the one which says the nation and the state are in constant need of being 'saved' by certain groups. As an historian, I can categorically state that the Turkish nation has a profound distaste for being 'saved'.

I am not saying any of this to criticize or belittle anybody. I am writing with the open-ended presumption that some errors might yet be corrected. Leaders have a tendency to believe they

know everything better than anybody. So they do not welcome opposing ideas. Therefore, I should state my objective at the outset.

How was it before 12 Sep and how was it after? Since the writing of history cannot be outlawed, and no government is capable of doing so, books will be written, and not in too distant a future.

Today, thousands are inside prisons. Thousands are in exile. None of them is an enemy soldier. They are all our kids. But most of them have treated their state like an enemy soldier would. Why? This has not received adequate attention as yet. I haven't read any serious piece of research over this issue. I haven't come across any enlightened explanation. How come thousands, tens of thousands of our very own children have behaved like enemy soldiers? Who has trained these bands of people calling themselves 'armies'? The Turkish nation still awaits clarification of these questions.

Those found with weapons were brought to court. When evidence was produced they were sentenced. This was as it should be. From a legal standpoint there was no other way. But no one dwelled on the causation of the crime. There was no sound discrimination between friends and enemies of the state. There was instead a 'balancing act'.

How did the mechanism, which grabbed our children away from us and turned them into enemies, operate? If we cannot investigate this point it is a foregone conclusion that we will encounter more trouble ahead, now that we are back to the old grind of democracy games.

I know many leaders will not be pleased with my opinions. But the high interests of the Turkish state require that we eradicate the swamp rather than go hunting mosquitos.

[4 Nov 86 p 9]

[Text] Today, empires are viewed as archaic structures of a bygone age, strange ensembles contrived out of a mosaic of nations. But there was a time when they had an indispensable role in world order, and some of them have been extremely successful. One may point that, even today, there are empires of that type, but go without bearing that name.

Our empire, which we call 'Ottoman', disintegrated rather badly as a result of chronic incompetence and short-sightedness. A smooth liquidation could not be made. Despite the common suppo-

sition, the Ottoman state was not a theocratic state. It was a political organization which gave pride of place to religion. But I cannot make a similar categoric denial and say "The Ottoman state was not a military state". During the initial, founding centuries the philosophy of 'everything for the army and for holy war' was the effective principle. But later... This army which had founded a giant empire -- among the three most durable in history -- becoming a thorn in the side of the state.

I have chronicled army rebellions throughout Ottoman history, through long translations from Ottoman chronicles. That was 20-25 years ago. I received many letters and phone calls, some of them critical. My readers inquired, "Why don't you tell the nice parts of our history, dwelling instead on the rather depressing aspects of army rebellions during the reigns of Osman II, Murad IV, Ahmed III and Selim III? The answer was very simple: Those rebellions were part of our history. We had to know about them as well. Indeed, my chronicles provided impetus for many artists who then wrote plays, produced films about those times.

I can categorically state one thing. And that is, in Ottoman history, there isn't a single rebellion, or military intervention, that did not cause harm to the high interests of the state and the nation. I have reiterated this theme in numerous volumes.

It was Mahmud II who obliterated such a useless army in 1826, and founded the modern army. But the love of politics, endemic to the Ottoman officer, seemed to win out in 1876, 1908, and 1909, seducing the modern army away from its assigned role. And subsequently the Empire fell upside down.

Ataturk, carefully maintained the practice of the Ottoman dynasty, that of keeping the army out of politics. But later the interventions of 60 and 71 came and did not serve the national interest. And the army got the worst of it, I think.

But I place the 12 Sep intervention in an entirely different category, viewing it as a state-inspired act. It is the only intervention in our history that is not the outcome of a junta operation, that is, it wasn't one of those operations initially executed by a junta, later to be ascribed to the whole army. Indeed, the late Celal Bayar was of the same view. This view holds that 12 Sep should be regarded in a favorable light because the operation prevented the Turkish state from collapse through a civil war instigated by outside forces. It does not mean that the political and social policies of the 12 Sep regime should be approved wholesale.

I somehow think that the future course of internal politics will not be far different from the pre-80 period. As an historian I am aware of the political weight of the army, or to be more to the point, the central role of the military officer. The position and conditions of the Turkish state is particular to itself. It is quite unlike any other state. And these conditions are permanent and continuous, they are not temporary. Therefore, no amount of care and sacrifice for Turkish Armed Forces is too much. They are well-founded and required by the national interest.

But in democracies the state is governed by the nation, which happens to be titleholder to the state. The national will and intent is of the essence, and they should not be contravened. It is about time that our experimentation is culminated with a permanent, authentic regime of democracy. It would have been better to have done it earlier, but it is better to enter the inevitable path right now rather than waste more time.

12466  
CSO: 3554/77

**DEVELOPMENTS ON RIGHT WING SPECTRUM**

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 22 Oct 86 pp 1, 15

[Article by Ugur Mumcu]

[Text] Speaking in Erzurum the other day Prime Minister Hon. Ozal said there were some people trying to spin a web for him. I wonder, who might that be?

Could it be Demirel?... The master is known for his deft handling of such matters. During his tenure as prime minister he has managed to derail democracy not once but twice; and once the storm passed he repaid in kind those who had slighted him. He has the knack of knowing when to speak and when to keep his mouth shut.

Well, could it be 'the left' who are spinning the web for Ozal? No, I don't think so. The left does not have enough yarn to spin anything worth talking about. The 'yarn' is partly in the hands of Inonu, and partly of Ecevit's. It is doubtful whether Social Democrats are capable of getting their own act together without tying themselves into knots, let alone create serious problems for others. It is more likely to see them, split into two halves as they are, trip over banana peels.

Then, who is really capable of causing sleepless nights for Ozal? If I were a betting man, I would say business and finance circles. How? I'll tell you how!

Look for signs of discontent, vague intimations of displeasure: 'Why are you divided?' To be followed by 'Why don't you get together?' The implicit arrangement being, 'Demirel for president Ozal prime minister'. It's a free country, after all!

It has been long understood by the business circles that Motherland Party (MP) is on the skids. They're good at sniffing such things before anyone. They obviously have decided that MP is a 'goner' but not about to disappear totally, and Correct Way Party's (CWP) star is rising. Now they are trying to open the

gates of Cankaya (the presidential residence) for Demirel to walk into, having quickly forgotten that, until just yesterday, they were busy applauding the 12 Sep regime.

As the old saying goes, in politics 'the king is dead, long live the king', or 'the master is gone, long live the pasha'. But in this case, the 'master' who would be departing is the one who came along with the pashas. The expected newcomer, on the other hand, not only is not a 'pasha' but the 'master' who departed when the '12 Sep pashas' arrived on the scene. Now are we about to see a reversal of roles?

I don't think so. As it so happens, business and finance circles want to see them both in power. How can this be, you might ask! As Sabanci and Koc before him, Balikesir Chamber of Industry President Rona Yircali has spoken (at a ceremony honoring those paying the highest taxes in the province):

Voters have indicated their support for a leader who is known for his tireless efforts, for many years and under trying circumstances, to get many of our development projects off the ground...

And who is that leader? Why, Demirel of course... Yircali continues:

The elections are now over. It is back to work now, to take up the things where we left off. What is the meaning of all the verbal exchanges and recriminations, when we know that both leaders unwaveringly subscribe to the same rightist political and economic views? After all, one of them is the architect of our country's development and the other has changed the direction of Turkish economic life, reinstated free enterprise, restored its dignity and opened up our country to the outside world... The supporters of free enterprise want to see these two parties unite under a single, broad umbrella and help maintain the liberal trend in the economy...

What we see here is the president of a professional organization engaging in 'politics', calling for the unification of MP and CWP. Apparently, the kind of political activity that is open to Chambers of Industry and commerce is not O.K. when it comes to Turk-Is. Well, it is either O.K. or it isn't.

What emerges from all this is that the quarters from which Ozal can expect trouble are business and finance circles. They seem to be saying, 'Demirel would be president, and Ozal, provided he gets sufficient votes, would be prime minister!' What if he doesn't? A post overseas maybe... Whether it would be a position with the World Bank, or overseas representation of ENKA

Holding is difficult to say at this point. We might know after the 88 election.

The groundwork for all this is already being laid by business and finance circles. Come the next election their wallets will be opened in support of CWP. Thus, we'll see the 3rd Nationalist Front being set up, and Demirel, with yarn in his hand, will start tying knots all over democracy which will be an exercise in *deja vu*.

And that will be some sight to see!

12466  
CSO: 3554/90

## POLL RESULTS ON YOUTH ATTITUDES, BELIEFS, PRIORITIES

Athens ENA in Greek 1 Jan 87 pp 55-60

[Article by Stratis Atarellis: "What Is Youth Seeking?"]

[Text] Greek youth love their parents, respect their teachers, and have reservations about politicians. They believe strongly in friendship and equality of the sexes. Unemployment, economic problems and defense of national independence are pre-occupying our young people--the same people who dance to rock and roll, go to the movies, accept religion but reject television and...books! Today ENA publishes the results of a poll which was conducted on behalf of the General Secretariat of the Youth Affairs [Ministry] and which defines the position of today's Greek youth.

[Note: The Figures in All Tables Represent Percentages]

## How Many Books Do Young People Read Each Year?

No of Books	15-19 Years Old		20-24 Years Old	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
None	28.1	18.6	32.5	21.5
1	8.5	6.1	3.4	6.3
2-5	39.0	39.3	30.8	34.0
6-10	12.9	19.5	16.2	17.4
More	11.5	16.5	17.1	20.8

## Problems Young People Face

	15-19 Years Old		20-24 Years Old	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Unemployment, economic problems	49.7	40.2	59.8	66.0
Generation gap	11.5	24.1	2.6	9.7
Education	14.9	15.2	14.5	9.7
Entertainment, recreation	7.0	5.2	1.7	--
Narcotics	3.9	5.9	2.6	6.3
Others (inter-personal upbringing, discipline)	11.4	6.6	17.3	6.3

### Youth and Politics

	15-19 Years Old	20-24 Years Old		
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Political gatherings	12.6	12.5	32.5	22.2
Syndicalist meetings	9.6	11.3	26.5	17.4
Youth or party festivals	17.1	22.0	6.0	2.8

### What Music Do Young People Listen To?

	15-19 Years Old	20-24 Years Old		
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Classical, opera	3.3	2.1	6.0	9.7
Disco	31.6	37.5	14.5	13.9
Rock, pop, new wave	46.8	35.3	41.9	19.5
Jazz	4.2	3.9	11.1	8.4
Rembetiko	19.2	14.0	35.9	29.2
Light, popular	9.6	25.9	12.8	27.0
Greek music, new wave	7.6	10.6	7.7	16.7
Other	1.4	1.2	3.4	2.0

### How Do They See Their Teachers?

15-19 Years Old	Boys	Girls
As friends	36.8	25.7
As autocratic or old fashioned	7.6	7.3
As masters imparting knowledge	6.3	11.7
As employees doing their work	41.7	46.1
As employees not doing a good job	7.6	9.2

### What Qualifications for Success?

	15-19 Years Old	20-24 Years Old		
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Money	21.3	19.8	23.9	27.8
Education	19.7	21.3	12.0	18.1
Will, perseverance, work	16.0	14.9	17.9	11.1
Courage, self confidence	7.9	10.1	11.1	14.6
Cleverness, exploit opportunities	8.1	10.4	7.7	9.7
Acquaintances, "pull"	4.8	6.7	6.0	7.6
Other (luck, brains, ambition, etc.)	21.2	16.4	19.7	10.5

### What Are Their Priorities?

Age: 15-19 Years Old

Order of Priority	Boys	%	Girls	%
1	Unemployment	45	Unemployment	43
2	National defense, security	32	Standard of living rise	30
3	Standard of living rise	28	Inflation	28
4	Inflation	26	National defense	23

Age: 20-24 Years Old

Order of Priority	Boys	%	Girls	%
1	Unemployment	49	Unemployment	51
2	National defense	35	National defense	37
3	Inflation	31	Standard of living rise	32
4	Pollution	27	Inflation	28

Sociability is a visible characteristic of today's youth and a noticeable difference from the youth of yesterday. As a rule, young people join groups, each one of which consists of 6-10 persons. The boys are in the majority and they meet daily, either in the evening or at night. We find that half of the 15-19 age group belong to all-male groups and the other half to mixed groups of equal numbers of both sexes. In mixed groups the males prevail among those in the 20-24 age group (65 percent).

A very small number of boys keep company with girls. By contrast the girls keep company with boys more often (15 percent).

Our youth believe in friendship and this is proved by the fact that an overwhelming majority (90 percent) stated that they have close friends and not just superficial acquaintances.

Security, trust and solidarity hold a particularly important place in the relations of young people with their friends. With regard to sincerity, the percentages are impressively high among girls (85 percent of them consider it an important element of friendship), as are affection and warmth (75 percent).

By contrast, young men attribute little importance to the social, economic and political views of their friends, as well as to their participation in organizations, societies and even to their age.

Young people consider intelligence, humor, hobbies, and cultural interests important but not indispensable. Appearances do not seem to play a particular role in their friendships.

#### Relations With Parents

First of all, what impresses us is that in both age groups (15-19 and 20-24) an overwhelming majority of boys and girls stated that relations with both their parents are good (the percentages fluctuate between 69 and 91 percent). It is worth noting that the percentage for boys in both age groups having good relations with both father and mother is higher than the corresponding percentage for girls--especially in the lower age bracket where the difference is considerable.

The existence of a problem in father-daughter relations in the 15-19 age group (25 percent have average relations) is confirmed by answers to the question on youth problems--about 25 percent of the girls in this age group consider the generation gap and oppression from their seniors as their primary problem. Views on religion are exchanged more among girls than boys. More than half of the latter (in both age groups) do not discuss it at all.

#### Youth and the Family

Young people and especially those in the 20-24 age group claim that their parents ask for their opinion regularly. The percentage of youth whose parents do not ask their opinion is minimal. Thus, a sufficiently high percentage of older boys and girls participate in family decision making. This holds true for only 25 percent of the lower age group members.

During critical or difficult times in their life young persons want to depend above all on their parents for economic and moral support. Friends come second, while very few would call on relatives for any assistance.

#### Teachers Are Friends

Views of youth on their teachers and professors are rather favorable--one-third of the boys and girls in the 15-19 age group consider them as friends. A considerable percentage (42 percent of the boys and 46 percent of the girls) take a neutral attitude (they consider them as employees just doing their job), while a very small number (15 percent) maintains a cautious attitude.

However, the percentage of young people which is influenced by teachers when searching for important decisions in their life (such as career and political ideology) is rather low, particularly among boys. Less than 30 percent of them say they are somewhat influenced on the question of their studies or professional orientation, while an insignificant number is influenced on matters concerning their personal life.

### **Indifference Toward Police**

More than half of the young people of both sexes are indifferent toward the police. A considerable percentage (35-41 percent) are sympathetic toward them while few say they have any animosity against them. The majority of youth feel that policemen show discrimination during the exercise of their duties either systematically or opportunistically.

At this point we should point out that several young people--especially girls--have not responded to the relevant question and that, among those who do express an opinion--the girls in the 20-24 group--believe more than the rest (42 percent) that the police discriminate repeatedly.

The fact is also revealing that about 60 percent of young people in the 20-24 age group continue to believe that the main target of police discrimination is not directed toward anarchists, notorious figures of the underworld, etc., but the "simple" people"--the economically poor, the socially unknown, the politically opposed--despite the political and social changes of the last decade. Youngsters in the 15-19 age group give less absolute answers but the basic attitude remains the same.

### **Politicians**

There are basically three categories to which different views of young people allude:

- a. One-third of the boys in the 15-19 age group and about 22 percent in the other groups have a favorable opinion of politicians ("they are representatives of the people for whose interest they work hard").
- b. About 25 percent of young people have a neutral view ("they are plain people who try to do their job well"). Generally youth's attitude toward politicians is rather positive (56 percent).
- c. One in three young men in the 20-24 age group, one in four boys in the 20-24 group, and one in three girls in the 15-19 group have a negative view of politicians ("they aim at their personal promotion and at satisfying their personal ambitions"). To these numbers we should add those who said they consider politicians mediocre or even corrupt (about one in two).

### **No TV and Movies**

Despite the fact that society expects young people to watch TV daily and systematically, the truth is that the majority of them (about half in the 15-19 age group and more in the 20-24 age group) is not attracted by the programs of our "much afflicted" TV channels. By contrast, there are many who listen to radio broadcasts and preferably to music programs.

--Only 12-15 percent of young people read more than 10 books in a year. One-third of the boys and one-fourth of the girls either do not read any books or read only one book during the year. Literary works are their preference.

--Magazines fare much better. Eight out of 10 boys in the 15-19 age group read them while the number of readers in the 20-24 group decreases noticeably (64 percent).

Impressive is the fact that about two-thirds of young people in the 15-19 age group and three-fourths in the 20-24 age group read newspapers regularly. On the other hand, more boys (10 percent) than girls (3 percent) in the 15-19 age group have never read a newspaper.

Cinema is youth's primary entertainment compared to theater, for which the picture is rather discouraging. Specifically, 40 percent of the boys and 20 percent of the girls in the 15-19 age group go to the cinema more than once a week, while around 30 percent of both sexes in the 20-24 age group go to the movies once a week.

#### Politics Repels

An impressive fact is the low (11-12 percent) registration of young people in political organizations compared to their large participation in political rallies which in the 20-24 age group is considerable (32.5 percent for boys and 22 percent for girls). Of interest also is youth participation in syndicalist meetings and demonstrations (26.8 and 17.0 percent, respectively, in the same age group).

However, the annual festivals organized by youth political organizations attract only 6 percent young boys and 2.8 percent young girls in the 20-24 age group, while the younger boys and girls (15-19 years old) attend such festivals in greater numbers (17 and 22 percent, respectively).

#### Unemployment is A Problem

Unemployment (40 percent) is the most important problem all young people of both sexes face followed by that of national security and defense. Only 27 percent of the girls in the 15-19 age group consider national defense more important than unemployment, standard of living and inflation in that order of priority.

#### Equality of the Sexes

Fewer than half of the boys in both age groups (an average of 54 percent) expressed the view that a woman's place should not be confined exclusively to the home. The rest either disagree or have no opinion. To the question if men should share housework equally with women, 59 percent said they would have no objection.

On the question about the rights and obligations of men and women, the percentage of boys who said there should be equality among both sexes is impressively high (78 percent). However, we should mention that several of the young men added the words, "it depends," to their answer as a precondition.

The answers of girls in both age groups are in harmony with modern views on women's positions. Thus, 83 percent (on the average) do not agree with the view that a woman's place is at home rather than at work. A higher percentage (86 percentage on the average) believes that men and women should share the housework while over 90 percent believes women should have the same rights and obligations as men.

The poll shows that youth's attitude toward religion changes as much as the latter changes from ideology to practice. Specifically, most young people of both sexes seldom go to church, while a percentage, fluctuating between 19 and 27 percent, never does.

However, more than half of those in the 15-19 age group considers religion an important part of their life. In the 20-24 age group the figures are smaller--38.5 percent for boys and 45 for girls.

#### Home and Automobile

To own a house or to improve the one they already have and to buy a car is the dream of one out of four young people in both age groups. And what would they do first and above all if they were financially comfortable? Most of them said they would first of all satisfy certain material needs. The boys would like to establish--after buying a home and car of course--their own business or invest their money.

The girls expressed their preference for traveling. Only 8 percent of young people said they would spend money for books, records, musical instruments, clothes, or other consumer goods or for financially assisting their families or friends.

Young people in both groups consider money, education, work and perseverance as indispensable means in life. And contrary to the widely prevailing view, acquaintances and "pull" are no longer considered indispensable for success in life. This is perhaps the most important message of the poll, the results of which will come to mind in the future when the young people of today have in their hands the reins of power over the country.

7520  
CSO: 3521/68

**HEADCOVER DISPUTE IN ACADEMIC COMMUNITY****Editorial Blasts Preoccupation with Dress****Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 4 Nov 86 p 1, 2****[Editorial by Taha Akyol]**

**[Text]** A 'highly important' item is shortly arriving on the agenda of the Higher Education Council (HEC) after an appeal made by Erzurum (Ataturk) University. HEC, which is supposed to prepare Turkey for the year 2000 in science and technology, will now be contemplating the 'right kind' of turban.

Our professors will engage in debates lasting for days and determine how a turban can be deemed 'reactionary' and in what way can it be viewed as 'Western'. Probably graphic designers will be brought in, and a certain shape and style of turban will emerge. And then a 'circular' will be sent to all universities and faculties. Deans will be standing in doorways, along with 'official controllers', examining the turbans of our girls: "Your turban is 1.3 cm too large, that is against 'progressive' standards... You must be reactionary... So take a hike, don't ever set foot in the university again!"

The university making the appeal reportedly hopes for a ruling which would specify a 'smaller' turban. Apparently, a smaller piece of cloth over one's head would signify Westernism! In the black winter of Erzurum the poor kids will try to prove their Western credentials even if their ears freeze over!

As I was writing these words I was thinking: Am I creating a caricature out of this? Is the issue really so important as to involve thousands of our girls getting kicked out of universities, being deprived of education? Is this really an acid test of 'progressivism'?

No, no, this is nothing but medieval scholasticism of the turban kind! It has no likeness in the whole world. If there is another country where headcover is banned or where turbans are mea-

sured by the centimeter we certainly would like to know about it! What we see here is a continuation of the pedantic mentality of the Ottoman slave-bureaucracy for whom clothes, if not maketh the man, certainly conferred certain prerogatives. As you know, it was a time-honored practice among that bureaucracy to promulgate dress codes for each social and cultural stratum, thus reinforcing the barriers of exclusivity between the strata. The late Yahya Kemal has noted the pernicious role played by the dress code in preventing the Islamization of Christian minorities, and hence contributing to the disintegration of the Empire.

Subjecting people to limitations as to whether they can cover their heads or not and arbitrarily allocating rights according to one's garb and attire is compatible neither with human rights, nor with democracy or scientific mentality.

This is cruelty. This is violence. This is an attempt to exclude people from society. This is an anarchic threat hanging over our future!

Gentlemen, you have no right to attach labels to people -- such as progressive or regressive -- according to the clothes they wear. This can no longer be dismissed as being merely childish, or even as despotic behavior. It has gone beyond that, recalling horrors of the Dark Ages. So, forget about this anachronistic enmity towards the turban and headcover. There are so many pressing issues to take care of... For a start you might try bringing a couple of Nobel prizes to our country -- in physics, chemistry, or literature. And you might also notice that your perennial refrain about being 'progressive' has yet to liberate us from 'underdevelopment', economic or otherwise. Nobody gained anything when you kicked out a woman chemistry teacher from the university (one who attained the rank of associate professor in U.S.) but we lost a chemistry teacher, and that in a country which has to resort to advertising to find such people.

It is arguable who Turkey's biggest enemy is, but the greatest hurdle to our development seems to be medieval scholasticism. The present squabble over turbans is not really worthy of a democratic Turkey. It's a shame... Rather than waste your time over turbans and the like, find out how many publications are coming out of your university!

#### 'Turban' Ban Lifted

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 4 Noy 36 pp 1, 2

[Text] Erzurum -- The turban ban at certain faculties of Ataturk University has finally been lifted, including Arts and Sciences Faculty where Dean Cakir made the announcement, "There is no turban ban." Turbaned students succeeded in having their

voices heard as far and as high as Prime Minister Ozal, demanding that the turmoil over garb and attire be ended. Turbaned students expressed their resentment by pointing out, "No one says anything about girls wearing tight bluejeans, so why are we being singled out? Don't we have a right to education?" Most male students made clear they supported the demands of turbaned girls.

#### No Turban Ban Says Dean

We sought the views of Professor Ahmet Cakir about the turban ban at Arts and Sciences Faculty. Cakir said, "There is no rule saying turbaned students cannot enter classes. They either wear turban or we take appropriate measures against those wearing headscarf. There is no ban on turbans within the Faculty compound. There hasn't been a ban in the first place."

#### Dean's Gaffe

As we were talking there was a knock on the door and a man entered the room. The man (whom we later found out to be Ahmet Savran, chairman of the department of Eastern provinces) inquired, "Professor, what are we to do with students wearing headcover? They want to enter classes, are we going to let them?" The dean answered, with obvious displeasure and gritting his teeth, "Of course, why shouldn't they? Take them in now, we'll talk later." There was no point in having further conversations with the dean. Everything was made crystal clear.

#### Rector Waits

Meanwhile, Rector of Ataturk University Professor Hursit Ertugrul, responding to our question about the turban issue, said: "We'll write to the Higher Education Council (HEC). Let them clarify the shape of the turban. We'll then make an announcement." Answering a question whether "turbaned students would be allowed to enter classes until HEC's ruling arrives," Ertugrul said: "That is up to the deans."

#### Turbaned Students Enter Classes

After the turban ban was lifted, turbaned students started entering classes freely. Feeling obviously happy over the outcome the students said: "We have never been instruments of anyone. All we ever wanted was wearing turbans. We thank the faculty administration."

12466  
CSO: 3554/81

SOCIAL

TURKEY

SEPARATIST PARTY OFFICER ARRESTED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 8 Oct 86 p 3

[Photo caption]

[Text] Huseyin Sonmez, known as the poet of KAWA (an illegal, separatist organization) is arrested by the police teams from the Operations Desk of the Civil Order Department. Sonmez is known to have served as press officer and poet within KAWA which was crushed by the security forces in the aftermath of 12 Sep. Subsequently sentenced, in absentia, to 5 years in prison by Diyarbakir Martial Administration Court No. 1 in a collective trial, the 35-year old Sonmez managed to hide for some time in a rented house in Istanbul. After a tip received by Operations Desk detectives, Sonmez was arrested following a raid into his house where separatist literature, pamphlets and poetry were found.

12466  
CSO: 3554/90

**CENSUS SHOWS 50.5 MILLION POPULATION**

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 22 Oct 86 p 6

[Text] Ankara -- State Statistical Institute (SSI) announced the final results of the 20 Oct 86 census. According to the 12th general census Turkey's population is 50,664,458. Of this figure, 26,865,757 reside in towns and urban districts (UDs) and 23,798,701 in rural districts (RDs) and villages.

The SSI report states that between 80-85 the overall rate of population increase has been 24.88 percent. For towns and UDs the figure is 40.02 percent, whereas for RDs and villages it is 9.06 percent. In 80 the ratio of combined town and UD populations within the general population was 43.9 percent, and the ratio for combined RD and village populations was 56.1 percent. In 85 these figures changed to 53 percent and 47 percent respectively, with towns and UDs registering an increase while RDs and villages showing a drop.

According to the SSI report, the most important factor contributing to these changes has been the administrative restructuring that occurred during 80-85 when some RDs and villages were reassigned to new administrative zones. As a result, a total of 2,348,311 was incorporated into the municipal zones of towns and UDs during 80-85.

Figures for our three largest towns are as follows (indicating the 85 population and the overall increase between 80-85):

- Istanbul: 5,475,982 (41.68 percent)
- Ankara: 2,235,035 (32.34 percent)
- Izmir: 1,489,772 (38.96 percent)

Results of the 85 census indicate that the highest rate of population increase, in terms of region, was observed in South-eastern Anatolia with 39.92 percent, and the lowest rate was recorded in the Black Sea region where it was 13.25 percent. Five towns with the highest rate of population increase have been: Sanliurfa, Kocaeli, Istanbul, Icel, Diyarbakir.

## DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ECONOMY IN FLANDERS, WALLONIA NARROW

Brussels DE STANDAARD in Dutch 29 Dec 86 p. 3

[Unattributed report: "Differences between Flemish and Walloon Economies are not very great; CEPESS [Center for Political, Economic and Social Studies] Differentiates 'Two Velocities' Debate;" first paragraph is DE STANDAARD introduction]

[Text] Brussels--One can "prove" a lot with statistics. The base of reference is of great importance. Thus it is obvious that a number of indicators show a pronounced difference between Flanders and Wallonia in the period 1974-1984, and that the difference has been decreasing recently. "Reorganization" in the Walloon industry has taken care that the "bad" figures disappeared and the "good" ones remained, so that the growth improved. Although the subject requires further investigation, it can nevertheless be determined that the difference between the Flemish and Walloon economies is not serious and that the economic and monetary union can bear more than the current differences.

That is the conclusion of a note by the CEPESS, the research service of CVP-PSC [Christian People's Party - Social Christian Party], on the theory of the two velocities, which asserts that the Flemish economy is in better condition than that of Wallonia.

The CEPESS note first of all looks at industrial employment. In that, a distinction is made between the regressive sectors (the obsolescing branches of industry) and the progressive sectors (which are growing rapidly). In the period 1974-1984 the share of job opportunity in the regressive sectors in Wallonia decreased by 9 percentage points, in Flanders by only 4 points. On the other hand, the share of job opportunity in the progressive sectors during the same period rose by 7 percentage points in the Walloon region, as against barely 3 points in the Flemish region.

Melchior Wathelet, the chairman of the Walloon regional government, who used these figures in his speech during the Ghent part of his round of Flanders, thus decided that the Walloon production structure is undergoing a fundamental change and is freeing itself from burdensome legacies.

CEPES does not contradict those figures, but adds:

- In 1984, 38.3 percent of the Flemish industrial job opportunity took place in the progressive industry, as against 29.2 percent in Wallonia;
- the total industrial job opportunity decreased in the period 1974-1984 by 38.4 percent in Wallonia and by 23.7 percent in Flanders;
- the job opportunity in the progressive sectors decreased in Flanders by 16.5 percent, in Wallonia by 19 percent;
- the share of Flanders in the total industrial job opportunity increased from 59.3 to 64.4 percent in the period involved, while the Walloon share decreased from 30.3 to 26.5 percent.

The strong decrease of the Walloon job opportunity share in the progressive sectors can be attributed to the equally strong decrease of the Walloon job opportunity in the regressive sectors. Thus it is a matter of a statistical phenomenon.

Over the past 10 years there has been a clearly diverging development with respect to industrial job opportunity and activity, primarily because of the disappearance of old sectors in Wallonia, which is positive in the long term. Nevertheless, there is still a pronounced difference in the structure of industry in Flanders and Wallonia.

#### Production

Industrial production (excluding construction) increased in Flanders by over 22 percent in the period 1974-1984. In Wallonia there was a decrease of 5 percent.

Since 1983 the evolution in Wallonia (+ 5.3 percent) has been more favorable than in Flanders (+ 4.2 percent). Forecasts for this year (by the Credit Bank) turn out more favorable for Flanders (+ 6 percent) than for Wallonia (+2 percent).

The disappearance of regressive companies has brought the growth rate closer together during the past few years. In the period before 1983, Wallonia's share in the industrial production in Belgium decreased to 26.6 percent (1984). For that matter, there is a general decrease of the South's share in the Belgian GNP: from 29.2 percent in 1974 to 26.7 percent in 1984.

The positive turn in industrial activities in Wallonia is not reflected in the unemployment figures. In those, the difference between Flanders and Wallonia increases. At the beginning of the eighties, total unemployment in Flanders did indeed increase more rapidly than in Wallonia, but from 1985 onward the number of unemployed started decreasing in Flanders while it increased further in Wallonia. In January 1986 the number of totally unemployed Walloons entitled to benefits was 61 percent higher than in 1980, and in Flanders 49 percent.

Wathelet emphasized in Ghent that the export ratio (export in percentage of total sales) of Wallonia is comparable to that of Flanders, and that both figures show an upward trend. That pronouncement is correct, even though Wathelet doesn't mention that both the export and total sales have risen faster in Flanders than in Wallonia. The "improvement" of the Walloon position thus is a purely statistical phenomenon. At the end of 1985, 63.3 percent of the Belgian export was realized by Flanders, 16.1 percent by Wallonia. As recently as 1980 the figures amounted to 61.1 percent and 18.1 percent respectively.

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CSO: 3614/29

**LO CHAIRMAN CHRISTENSEN ON WAGE TALKS, ELECTIONS, SDP TIE**

Copenhagen AKTUELIT in Danish 26 Dec 86 p 15

[Interview by Arne Thing: "More Pay Can Be Afforded"]

[Text] LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] President Knud Christensen on the collective bargaining, on the present and perhaps coming government, on the structure of the labor movement--and on his New Year's wishes.

[Question] How are the Danes getting along?

[Answer] "This is hard to answer. Some are even having a very difficult time of it: the unemployed, the ill, the lowest paid. But the privileged Danes, who are looked after by the government, are certainly doing very well."

One of LO President Knud Christensen's wishes for the New Year is--not unexpectedly--a change in government, so the social balance in Denmark can be corrected. But at the same time the labor movement itself and the entire job market are facing some decisive weeks and months, which to a great extent will have an influence on every single Dane's daily life.

"I am hoping that LO members will be better off after the contract renewal," Knud Christensen says. The mess which was made with the government's contract dictate in 1985 must be corrected.

The collective bargaining will surely come to take place on a decentralized basis, but the common demands will be shortening of the work week to 35 hours, a solidarity wage policy, low-wage protection, and heightening of the ATP [Labor Market Supplementary Pension] contribution and the contribution to the Training Fund.

**Difficult Negotiations**

[Question] It is usually said about the imminent collective bargaining that it will be the most difficult hitherto. Does this apply this time, too?

[Answer] "There is no doubt that the coming negotiations are full of problems. We realize that the balance of payments development is very serious. Both the government and employers are exploiting the problems in an

attempt to prompt the labor movement's negotiators to be reserved in order to avoid reducing industry's competitiveness. This is contributing to making the negotiations difficult."

[Question] But it is certainly incontestable that the balance of payments deficit is the largest since the time of Gorm the Old, is it not?

[Answer] "Yes, and something must be done about it. Industry must put its stakes on product development, research and seeking out export niches around the world. And the efforts of smaller and medium-size firms to enter the export market must be strengthened."

#### It Can Be Afforded

[Question] The balance of payments deficit is high and exports are stagnating in the current situation. How can wage hikes be afforded?

[Answer] "It could be asked with greater fairness whether the society can afford the immense profits and big surpluses which firms produced in both 1985 and 1986. Reasonable wage improvement and shortening of the work week can of course be afforded simultaneously with our being able to maintain competitiveness."

[Question] How do you perceive the work place's expectations for the collective bargaining?

[Answer] "Those groups which have had to stay within the narrow contract limits of 1985 are especially waiting for a redressing. There is also a clear expectation of a shorter work week."

#### Ready to "Fight"

[Question] Where is the "conflict dividing line?"

[Answer] "If a fair outcome is not achieved, I am convinced that our members will fight."

[Question] Has LO been sidelined by the decentralized negotiations?

[Answer] "On the face of it, one could think so. But very much activity has been displayed on LO's part, both in the preparation of data for the negotiation committees and in meeting activities, where the stage was set for the solidary coordination of demands and negotiations. It is my impression that the solidarity within LO's membership is greater than ever. But it is obvious that the situation is different than earlier, when it was always possible to agree on a timetable which always resulted in the common, general questions' being negotiated at the level of the head organization."

Strength Relative to DA [Danish Employers Association]

[Question] In contrast to LO, DA has the right to veto the negotiation result of its member organizations. Does this say anything about the relative strength of the two head organizations?

[Answer] "On the sheer face of it, this gives DA greater control over which agreements its member organizations enter into. On second consideration, I do not think that this is of great importance, with the support behind LO's line in our member organizations."

[Question] Nevertheless, you yourself have drawn attention to tensions between the various bargaining areas, have you not?

[Answer] "That is due to the government's intervention. Some were forced to stay within the contract legislation's wage limits of 3.5 percent for two years, while other groups had average wage hikes of 5 percent in each contract year. This has resulted in tensions both in the private job market and in relations between the private and public job market. It has impeded the collective bargaining."

#### Solidarity

[Question] Is solidarity on trial?

[Answer] "It always is. But as lately as up to Christmas here it was on trial among the public job market's organizations, which found their way to a key to fair distribution in connection with their contract demands."

[Question] In addition to the collective bargaining, the labor movement is facing decisive negotiations concerning its internal structure in the coming year, is it not?

[Answer] "We have never before worked so intensively on having, and felt it so urgently necessary to have our structure changed as now. An LO committee is working on the problem with a view toward presenting a proposal to the LO Congress in the fall of 1987. In coordination with this, we are working intensely on education reform. The efforts are going toward adjusting the labor movement's structure so that it applies to both present and future activities in industry and so that the labor movement can tackle the problems appropriately, both organizationwise and educationwise. I think we will get radical changes in comparison with the present structure."

[Question] Does the labor movement have desires for its opponent's, DA's, structure?

[Answer] "I hope that DA will adapt its structure to the changes which take place in the labor movement. Both organizations ought to be interested in having a structure which resembles each other's."

#### Arrogant Government

[Question] In what way has the government influenced the job market?

[Answer] "On every side and in every direction it has had a negative influence, as far as both the contract terms, labor market policy and employment are concerned. We have 230,000 unemployed. The forecasts say that unemployment will climb, and the government is assuming a fantastically arrogant position in this regard. There must be a change in government if anything effective and positive is to take place."

[Question] Is there a sufficiently strong alternative?

[Answer] "The Social Democratic Party in cooperation with the labor movement has prepared an alternative program, 'Denmark for All the People,' which can correct in an impartial and sensible way the calamities the Schluter government is responsible for, and which can reintroduce a reasonable degree of employment. I hope that it will be possible to have a sensible coalition formed with the SF [Socialist People's Party], but I question whether it will take place in a coalition government. The disagreement regarding defense and foreign policy has been too great for this, in my opinion."

#### New Year's Wishes

[Question] What are your New Year's wishes like?

[Answer] "That we can get the Schluter government replaced by a Social-Democratic-led government, that the LO Congress will find a solution to our structure and education problems, and that we in cooperation with the Social Democratic Party get 'Denmark for All the People' carried through, so that the social redressing and shortening of the work week can become a reality. But right here and now it is a question of getting the contract renewal carried through with a good outcome."

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CSO: 3613/40

## BRIEFS

DROP IN TRADE WITH USSR--Our trade with the USSR last year showed a 50 percent drop compared to 1985. This conclusion was reached by Greek and Soviet delegations that have been negotiating on the ministerial level over the past few days for the purpose of rekindling and invigorating trade between the two countries. Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Ivanov, head of the Soviet delegation, held meetings with Greek Minister of Commerce Roumeliotis and Deputy Minister of Industry Petsos. Topics discussed included prospects for the establishment of a Greek-Soviet alumina production unit and an increase in products to be traded. Mr Roumeliotis said the primary reason attributed to the decrease in trade in 1986 was the drop in the price of petroleum that limited Soviet revenues and forced the Soviet Union to decrease its imports. The big problem with the Soviet Union is that it does not agree to receive Greek products as compensation for our imports of petroleum. Since it considers petroleum products as being "hard" products it refuses to consider them within the context of trade but demands foreign currency instead. Thus, there is always a big imbalance in our trade, of course, to the detriment of our country. /Text/ /Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 11 Feb 87 p 17/ 5671

EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS--According to Ministry of Labor data, registered unemployed in January was less compared to January 1986. The ministry data mentions that the number of unemployed registered in January 1987 was 147,852 --8 percent-- compared to 154,803 --8.5 percent-- in January 1986. The number of workers released in January 1987 was 21,090 compared to 22,492 in January 1986. The overall labor force in the country in January 1987 was 1,854,200 compared to 1,820,100 in January 1986. /Text/ /Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 11 Feb 87 p 9/ 5671

CSO: 3521/77

**ARMED FORCES COMMANDER'S BOOK: DEFENSES STILL CREDIBLE**

Copenhagen AKTUEL T in Danish 3 Jan 87 p 14

[Article by peb: "Armed Forces Chief: Our Defense System Is Still Credible"]

[Text] The Danish defense system is still militarily credible.

The armed forces commander, Admiral S.E. Thiede, says this in the preface to a new book, "Forsvarets Rolle" [The Role of the Armed Forces], which is coming out on 8 January. The book is appearing in the middle of a debate which is leading up to political decisions of decisive importance for the organization and size of the armed forces.

The book is being published by the Armed Forces Command, and according to S.E. Thiede it is not its purpose to present concrete proposals for the armed forces' future content and size. On the contrary, it will "create understanding for the fact that funds for the armed forces are balanced in accordance with their purposes." Which certainly no one will oppose.

The year 1987 will be an important year for the armed forces, the armed forces commander says, besides, in his New Year's greeting to regular personnel and draftees.

S.E. Thiede continues: "The approaching political debate will be decisive for to what extent the armed forces will be furnished with additional funds so that the downward trend of up to now can be stopped, and for whether the armed forces can continue as a credible instrument of Denmark's security policy and as a serious contribution to the combined NATO forces for peace and security."

The admiral hopes that the negotiations in 1987 concerning the next armed forces compromise, which will go into effect as of the turn of the year in 1987-88, will result in broad political agreement: "It is my hope that broad political agreement can be created regarding a budget which will make possible further growth of the armed forces within the present level."

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CSO: 3813/40

**COMBAT SCHOOL CHIEF DISCUSSES PROBLEMS REVEALED IN EXERCISE**

Copenhagen AKTUELIT in Danish 20 Dec 86 p 5

[Article by Peter Bergen: "Danish Soldiers Will Shoot at One Another in a War"]

[Text] Oksbøl. If there is a war tomorrow, Danish soldiers will fire away at one another. For they do not check well enough before they pull the trigger. Or they cannot distinguish friend from foe.

It happens time after time during exercises that Danish units fire at their own units, relates the commander of the Army Combat School, Colonel J.E. Zilmer. He has noted the Danish soldiers' suicidal tendencies on the exercise grounds in Oksbøl, for one thing.

"They are hitting the target better and better. But it is not so good when it is one's own forces the marksmanship is directed against."

Colonel J.E. Zilmer does not think it is just a question of slovenly work, but also of deficient training. He now wants to start a debate in the army on the danger of committing suicide.

"It is a very fundamental problem which is a nightmare to us. The basic observation and reporting service does not function. We are aware of the problem here in Oksbøl and we are doing what we can to teach people to recognize the difference between friend and foe. But they are in a tremendous fix at other training spots."

"It is true that the Warsaw Pact's tanks differ a lot from the West's. But they are getting to resemble one another more and more. And in battle there are only a few seconds for identifying a tank. As a rule, from a rather small part of the tank. Some weapons systems view vehicles on a TV screen or as an infrared outline," the colonel says.

The Danish army has to work together with the West German in the United Command for Jutland and Schleswig-Holstein. Like the Danes, the West Germans have Leopard tanks, but their armored personnel vehicles are completely different from the Danish. And therefore they risk becoming targets for the Danes' weapons.

**Captain J. Egendal of the Jutland Dragoon Regiment--furnished with Leopard tanks--suggests that the risk of firing away at one's own units is eliminated by painting marks, letters and/or numbers on these vehicles. The numbers are painted on the side and in front and must be able to be read by the naked eye at a distance of 400 to 500 meters.**

**The Soviet army has used such a system for a long time. During the attack on Czechoslovakia in 1968 all invasion vehicles had a wide white stripe painted on them so East Germans, Hungarians, Poles and Soviet troops would not fire away at one another.**

**Of course, the system has a big minus: The enemy can also quickly identify the vehicle. The advantages outweigh the disadvantages, Captain J. Egendal believes, if the numbers are covered up when there is no risk of being fired at by one's own side.**

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CSO: 3613/40**

**DEBATE ON UPCOMING DEFENSE PROGRAM CENTERS ON POLICY VIEWS**

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 24 Dec 86 p 4

[Article by Jakob Vinde Larsen and Steen Valgreen-Voigt]

[Text] The recurrent fight in connection with the defense agreement, which will expire by the end of 1987, is already in full swing. The Social Democratic Party has proposed that the expenditures for the defense be based on the present, favorable defense agreement and the current level. The coalition parties, however, find it necessary to raise the level by 800 million kroner to a total of 13.8 billion kroner. An increase of 6 percent.

However, unlike previous disagreements, the present disagreement involves more than kroner and ører. Fundamental disagreements on the future structure for the Danish defense may complicate the negotiations to such a degree as to make the money a secondary consideration.

**Focus on the Funds**

To the opposition, the question of the funds, however, is the main issue for the time being.

The chairman of the Social Democratic Party, Anker Jørgensen, started with a statement "to the right and the left" to the effect that the party does not want to go to extremes either way when it comes to defense expenditures. Thus a "zero solution" with a built-in adjustment.

Shortly afterward, Prime Minister Poul Schluter took the opportunity at a press meeting following one of the weekly cabinet meetings to attack the "zero solution" of the Social Democratic Party, and he presented figures which appeared the same day in an article in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. It appeared from these figures that the Danish Social Democratic Party was the only one in the Nordic countries to advocate a "zero solution."

"It is worth noting that moderate increases have taken place both in the NATO country of Norway and in the neutral countries of Sweden and Finland. It is no good signal to our partners if Denmark chooses go below the other countries. That makes us lose our credibility both in the Nordic countries and in NATO," the prime minister said.

The Nordic sister parties of the Social Democratic Party, all of which are today in power, want increases in their defense budgets ranging between 3.0 and 3.8 percent.

#### **Unreasonable Comparison**

Defense Minister Hans Engell, however, admits that it is not reasonable to make a comparison the way Schluter does it.

"I am fully aware that it is not possible to compare, for example, the Norwegian 3 percent with a pure Danish zero," Hans Engell tells INFORMATION.

Unlike the Norwegian defense expenditures, the Danish defense expenditures are not merely adjusted on the basis of the general price and wage trends but also according to currency fluctuations and price increases of ordered hardware.

During the period from 1978 to 1983, for which the final figures have been rendered by the Department of Statistics, the annual increase in defense expenditures ranges between 6 and 28 percent. In 8 years, from 1978 till today, the expenditures have doubled from well over 6 billion kroner to approximately 13 billion kroner.

#### **'Incredibly Good Arrangement'**

"The Danish adjustment arrangement is a solution that is incredibly good and which so far is unknown in other NATO countries, where they may say that they add 3 percent to the defense budget without any adjustment mechanism. The question then is what is the best solution in the final analysis," Knud Damgaard, defense policy spokesman of the Social Democratic Party, tells INFORMATION.

"When offered a 3 percent increase the last time they concluded a defense agreement, the Norwegian defense chief answered that he would prefer the Danish adjustment arrangement."

"If the defense budget this year amounts to approximately 12 billion kroner and next year will amount to approximately 13 billion kroner, it is a reflection of the adjustment mechanism, i.e., an increase of well over 8 percent," Knud Damgaard says.

#### **Undermining the Defense**

Defense Minister Hans Engell tells INFORMATION that he "of course, is fully aware of the fact that the adjustment arrangement we have is better than the one the Norwegians have." "But that does not change the fact that even if we take the total defense budget plus the supplementary grant, which is added to it and which is a reflection of the adjustment, the Norwegian defense budget remains a couple of billion kroner larger than the Danish defense budget," Engell says.

"A price and wage adjustment arrangement is only an adjustment in relation to actual cost increases, but it is not an adjustment which enables us to keep up with technological developments and carry through required procurements of materiel. It means that the defense will become undermined over a number of years when there are no funds to replace discarded materiel."

Hans Engell points out, among other things, that the share of the budget allocated in this country to modernization and purchases of new equipment is lower than in the other NATO countries.

Denmark spends 16-17 percent, whereas the other countries spend between 20 and 25 percent.

"The Social Democratic Party does not want to spend more money but nevertheless visualizes costly purchases of new equipment of a high technological level," Hans Engell says.

#### Discard Old Equipment

To this, Knud Damgaard answers that it is more a question of priorities within the present framework and of avoiding purchasing equipment that will soon become obsolete.

The Social Democratic Party wants to make cutbacks in the weapons systems which the party considers inexpedient and too costly in use. By discarding the frigates of the Navy which safeguard Danish sovereignty in the Baltic, savings of a total of 300 million kroner may be made in the operational budget, Knud Damgaard says.

The surveillance of the Baltic by the frigates will be transferred to the Air Force, which will keep an eye on Soviet vessels with its so-called Gulfstream aircraft. In a "gray period," i.e. before the onset of an actual crisis, the frigates watch Soviet vessels passing through Danish waters.

"However, that task may easily be performed by any cargo steamer, as long as it is equipped with a warning gun," says Knud Damgaard. "Surveillance is both cheaper and more efficient by means of aircraft. It may be done by means of aircraft without pilots--the so-called drones. By removing the frigates, one may release funds which may then be spent in other defense areas."

In the opinion of Knud Damgaard, the frigates are not profitable.

It will also be an advantage to remove the Danish submarines, the Social Democratic Party says. The party, however, has made an agreement with the government under which the Navy will be ensured three old Norwegian submarines of the Kobben class. Under the agreement, the submarines will disappear in 1995.

"Submarines are not the weapons system best capable of survival in the Baltic. In addition, a future invasion fleet, if any, will consist of air-cushion vessels capable of fast transportation of manpower and tanks. In view of

the high rate of speed of air-cushion vessels, the torpedo system of the Danish submarines will be completely useless," Knud Damgaard says.

#### Obsolete Tanks

Nor are the Danish Centurion tanks in their present state of much use. But instead of purchasing new tanks at a cost of 32 million kroner each, a thorough overhaul may be carried through at the maximum cost of 6 million kroner per tank. Spending 6.4 billion kroner on the purchase of 200 new tanks would be unwise, says Knud Damgaard. By the late nineties, due to sensor developments, the tanks will anyway be as vulnerable as large surface vessels, he says.

"The most important task for a defense system is to control a crisis, and, in this respect, initial preparedness is of great importance, i.e., the force one is able to deploy right away without having to mobilize. This preparedness will have to be reinforced, though not necessarily by increasing the number of conscripts," says Knud Damgaard in answer to the desire on the part of the defense minister to have an additional 2,000 conscripts called up.

"The initial preparedness will consist of a permanent core of enlisted privates, sergeants and other permanent personnel as well as the officers' school, and that will be a good thing in a practical and positive crisis control process. The government does not at all want to agree to this. They want conscripts only," Knud Damgaard says.

The Social Democratic answer with regard to the future defense structure consists of modernization and solutions across the three services, for example, involving surveillance tasks.

"The Defense Command is too bureaucratic, and no renewal is accomplished by continuing to base oneself on the traditions of the old services. There is therefore no doubt that our proposal will meet with enormous opposition within the Defense Command," says Knud Damgaard.

"The defense system will not come up with any new ideas, and the division into three services will be maintained as long as the three services keep making deals behind the scenes. That is the dilemma of the Danish defense policy."

Underlying the dispute are, moreover, the ideas on the part of the Social Democratic Party of a defensive, non-threatening defense in contrast with the wishes of the coalition parties for an advanced and thus also potentially threatening defense.

The Social Democratic Party finds, among other things, that a mobile land-based missile defense will replace a number of the present tasks of the Navy.

#### Division of Work in NATO

The defensive defense ideas on the part of the Social Democratic Party will also encounter criticism within NATO. But Knud Damgaard refers to the

considerations of the alliance concerning specialization in the area of defense.

According to the Social Democrats, there must be a division of work within NATO to prevent the same military development in all regional NATO areas. West Germany could, for example, manage the submarine front in the Baltic alone without Danish participation, and Denmark could subsequently give higher priority to other defense tasks within the North flank. That would be more efficient, the Social Democratic Party says.

Defense Minister Hans Engell is able to follow the ideas of a division of work within NATO and has tried to launch a discussion on such specialization within the alliance.

"The debate, however, has not met with sympathy among our partners within the alliance," he says. "A division of work will also give rise to certain political problems in our area. One country might have to watch the sovereignty of another country. If the specialization within NATO will take place, I wish to stress that this does not mean that some countries get an easier deal and may reduce their budgets," says Engell adding that one might just as well from the start plan a division of work, which economic considerations will render necessary under any circumstances in the long view.

However, until NATO takes actual steps toward a division of work, Hans Engell wants to adhere to the present defense structure. The Social Democratic criticism of the slackness of the defense system and its lack of innovations is neither here nor there, Hans Engell says.

"We have been working on solutions across the various services. We have a joint defense command, and the defense budgets do not allow for rivalry among the three services," he says.

The present adjustment arrangement has worked well to a certain degree, the defense minister says. Without it, the defense system would have been in a much worse situation than the one prevailing today.

"Things are not in as bad a shape as indicated by other NATO countries. Denmark has always been praised for its use of its defense budgets. The input is too small, but the result has been good enough," he says. "However, due to the low grants, we have been faced with a lot of problems, and the defense system is today in a critical situation.

"Even if we are unable to replace old equipment or match the equipment of the East Bloc countries in the ratio of one for one, the developments will have to be viewed in relation to the task. The deterrent effect will still have to exist.

#### Urgent Problems

The 800 million kroner that Engell wants will first and foremost be spent on an additional 2,000 conscripts to prevent an unacceptable high average age among the mobilization forces. The credibility of the Danish defense will

decline if the soldiers become too old, the minister says.

"To this comes that the defense system is faced with the essential equipment project, which will have to be carried through. We have made inroads into our stocks of munitions and spare parts, and considerable investments will be needed to renew the stocks. In addition, the expenditures for the infrastructure of NATO will increase after 1987," Hans Engell says.

According to Hans Engell, the 800 million kroner will only solve the most urgent problems in the coming 5 years. The defense system will still be compelled to keep old weapons systems alive, long after they ought to have been replaced, the defense minister says.

Engell, however, is not willing to discard the Danish submarines and frigates.

"The frigates will not be discarded as long as there are no funds for their replacement. By leaving the surveillance of the Baltic to the Navy, one has far better possibilities of obtaining information and upholding Danish authority than by solving the problem by aircraft. Unlike aircraft, ships are able to remain in the area constantly," he says.

The defense minister announces that the government's final proposals in connection with the negotiations on the future defense agreement will be presented around 1 March. In addition, the government will present its future plans for the next 15 years. The government wants an agreement covering 5 years, whereas the Social Democratic Party wants to adhere to the present 3-year period.

#### Working Toward Agreement With Social Democratic Party

"The government is working toward an agreement with the Social Democratic Party, and we expect the Social Democratic Party to do the same thing. I should like to see if the Social Democratic Party will be able to adhere to a defense agreement with the Socialist People's Party and the Left-Socialist Party," Hans Engell says, adding that the two parties will have to find a solution.

The defense minister finds that a 3-year agreement will make it difficult to carry through things, because discussions on a new defense agreement already start halfway into the period.

On the other hand, he agrees that a 5-year plan presupposes agreement on certain structural changes in the Danish defense system.

"I expect difficult negotiations because of these fundamental disagreements," Hans Engell says, adding, however, that "perhaps the disagreements are not as great as one thinks."

"The Social Democratic Party has changed its position a great deal, for example, on the issue of an advanced defense in Schleswig-Holstein. We do not disagree that we need the best possible surveillance in the Baltic but only on how to accomplish it."

On the other hand, Hans Engell does not disagree that the defense of Zealand may be modernized according to the guidelines of the Social Democratic Party regarding a flexible defense, under which helicopters and lightweight tanks may replace the old, heavy tanks. "But not Jutland," the defense minister says.

#### Important Analyses

A helping hand that may solve the fundamental disagreement may be expected to come from the advisory analysis group that was set up by the two parties following the last defense agreement.

The group was given the task of making an analysis of five different aspects of the future defense:

- (1) The future importance of submarines;
- (2) Synthetic radar surveillance in F-16 aircraft;
- (3) The possible application of land-based sea target missiles;
- (4) Navel helicopters, and
- (5) Replacement of the old Centurion tanks.

Even if neither Knud Damgaard nor Hans Engell intend to undertake in advance to comply with the directions of the group of experts, they agree that it will play an important role in the debate.

The initial reports of the group of experts will be presented in the early part of the new year.

Despite the uneasiness, which will not be eased by the fact that the negotiations will take place in an election year, neither party really wants to make the difficulties bigger than they are at present.

The government has no possibility of persuading the fundamentally anti-militaristic Radical Liberal Party to become a party to the defense agreement, and the Social Democratic Party is unable as well as unwilling to enter into an agreement with the Socialist People's Party, which has proposed a 10 percent cut in the defense expenditures.

7262

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**COSTS, PROJECTS OF NEW DEFENSE BUDGET ANALYZED**

Paris DEFENSE NATIONAL in French Jan 87 pp 158-162

[Article by Georges Vincent: "Military Planning Law for 1987-1991"]

[Text] A Better Guarantee of Resources for the Army

Last November, first the National Assembly, then the Senate, passed the 1987 defense credits. Preparation for this budget had been closely coordinated with the formulation of a new draft program-bill pertaining to military equipment for 1987-1991. This draft, approved by the Council of Ministers of 6 November, was filed on that same day with the bureau of the Assembly and sent back to the National Defense Commission. The latter then heard Minister of Defense Giraud and appointed its president, Fillon, as chairman of the project. For lack of time, the report in question and the opinions of the Commission could not therefore be submitted to the Assembly before the vote on the 1987 credits scheduled for 12 November. The Assembly will be called upon to decide on this bill at its next session.

We will analyze this draft bill which, if it were approved, will control the development of our national defense resources far beyond 1991, and 1987 will be the first year to show a recovery that has become a necessity after the stagnation and shortages of these past years.

The acknowledged lag between the objectives of the 1984-1988 military planning law and its actual implementation had grown to such an extent that the law passed in July 1983 could no longer serve as reference for planning. Rather than attempting to revise a law built on erroneous theories it was better to start again with current data and repeal a text that had become practically inoperative. The summary of the motives listed at the beginning of the new draft bill analyses the causes of this real lapse.

**Reasons For a Failure and Lessons To Be Drawn From It**

Three main reasons must be retained among the causes leading to this lag to which the 1984-1988 law fell victim. In the first place, the economic hypotheses which had served to its formulation can no longer be retained. The financial objectives which it set were expressed in current francs. As it stand, the anticipated price increases proved to be inexact, not enough for 1984 and 1985 and, on the contrary, too much for 1986, 1987 and 1988.

In addition, implementation of the law was stretched and the budget appropriations actually released were smaller than the amounts inscribed in the law, resulting in a lag, already significant in 1985 and greatly increased by 1986, whereas, on the contrary, the law called for an intensification of the financial effort for all of 1986-1988.

Finally, the implementation of the law was also altered because, whereas unscheduled projects, such as the Helios system, were launched, no decision was taken to implement others, and not among the least such as those of the second nuclear component and the airborne detection system, although they were inscribed in the law. A review of the whole plan was therefore necessary.

Drawing a lesson from the difficulties which the two previous laws had encountered, in particular anticipating price increases within 5 years and from these the growth of operative expenses, and, should there be budget difficulties, the risk of seeing investments sacrificed to operating expenses which, by nature, can be reduced very little, the government based its planning bill on the following principles, which clearly differentiate this bill from the preceding laws.

It concerns a law pertaining exclusively to equipment credits (Title 5) in order to stress the top priority given to that Title;

the financial objectives are expressed as payment credits and not as program authorizations;

they are expressed in constant francs, in other words, in volume, and not in current francs; and

it concerns a long-term plan with variable limits beginning in 1989, at which time the government pledges to submit an implementation report to Parliament. The directives pertaining to equipment and concomitant credits for 1989, 1990, 1991 and the following 1992 and 1993, will be reviewed on the basis of the economic situation and the state of the defense, so that the government will have permanently available a 5-year term forecast tool.

#### Resources and Targeted Objectives. Priority for Nuclear Deterrent

For the next 5 years, equipment credits are set up as follows

##### Payment Credits

(in million francs)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Payment credits including	84 127	89 100	94 450	100 120	106 200
Credits for participation to public interest expenditures coming from the transfer of assets	—	2 300	800	800	800

Let us note that a share, small to be sure, will come from the transfer of real estate no longer needed by defense. It is also apparent from this table that equipment credits will increase regularly by 6 percent annually and that this growth will be reflected in constant francs thus shielding defense from the hazards of rising current prices. That is a guarantee that our armies had never received before.

While it shows a break from previous financial commitments, the new project demonstrates, in its presentation of motives and its appendix pertaining to the programs to be implemented, a continuity in its defense policy: National service, with the draft, remains the root of the policy based on deterrence. The latter, which gathers all resources, with nuclear as a priority, must neither be cut into, nor divided, nor circumvented. In order to maintain itself above the threshold of credibility, the equipment policy has been given seven goals:

To continue the equipping of missile launching nuclear submarines with the M4 weapon system;

to continue the buildup and improvement of the security of the communications and command network of our nuclear forces;

to study and develop a new SNLE [missile launching nuclear submarine] with improved performance as to quietness of operation and invulnerability;

to improve the weapon system of the SNLE and develop with the M5 system a ballistic missile with sufficient penetration capability to keep up with the advances of the opponent's defense;

the minister of defense indicated during his meeting with the Defense Commission that this missile could be introduced into service in 1999. He declared, however, that, without waiting for this introduction, the "stealth" ("furtivité:" neologism to express the fact that these nuclear heads will be hard to detect on radars) of the heads and the reduction of the nuclear charges will be introduced in the M4 system, thus increasing their penetration capability and range;

to prepared the replacement of the strategic nuclear components, land (missiles of the Albion plateau) and air (Mirage IV), by developing a new component in the form of a light ballistic missile capable of grazing trajectories and penetration of protected targets. Concerning this missile, Giraud specifies that it could eventually be deployed outside the Albion plateau;

to acquire the means of satellite observation giving our country the capability to assess threats and crises autonomously; and

to build and deploy ships with antisubmarine capability, mine-destroying vessels and sea-patrol aircrafts in sufficient number to guarantee the carrying out and security of the SNLE patrols.

Such are the actions that will enable France to maintain its strategic nuclear deterrent capability at the desired level. In addition, it will continue to

have at its disposal a prestrategic nuclear armament the use of which will have the value of an ultimate warning; however, it will also have to have a military effectiveness capable of causing significant damages to the enemy. Thus, specified Giraud, the number of our prestrategic nuclear weapons must not drop below a certain level. Moreover, the use of this armament, which is the subject of the Hades program alone, is the president of the republic's sole responsibility and its usage as a means of progressive reprisal has never been considered, neither has its being placed at the disposal of the military command.

As for the enhanced radiation weapon (neutron arm), it is an ammunition and not a weapon system. Its cost does not affect that of the weapon system. Decision for its manufacture is the responsibility of the Defense Council whose decisions can remain secret.

Before dealing with the goals set by the law on the subject of traditional weapons, let us note the link which exists between conventional and nuclear elements and the military scope of prestrategic armament. This comes implicitly under the paragraph asserting: "The existence of a disequilibrium between face-to-face conventional forces can only be compensated by the link between conventional forces and the threat of recourse to nuclear weapons."

#### Traditional Weapons

The law assigned one paragraph to the estimate of what will constitute a basic minimum for air-land forces: 1,100 tanks, 500 artillery pieces, 8,000 armored vehicles, 500 helicopters and 450 in line combat planes. In addition, resources must be organized and prepared in such a way as to be able to react very rapidly: At the earliest hours for air resources and in the very first days for the land army.

For protection against the air threat, defense will be equipped with airborne systems of distant detection and means of destruction of low-flying aircrafts and missiles. Giraud said that the airborne system of detection is currently the subject of a joint evaluation with Great Britain; a decision will be taken; once the evaluation is completed.

As for the navy, it will have to have at its disposal ships and aircrafts in sufficient number to ensure the security of maritime approaches and of the seas surrounding us, with the aid, in particular, of 30 to 35 sea patrol planes and attack nuclear submarines which, indicated the minister, could, beginning with the ninth, belong to a new generation.

For foreign theaters of operations, transport capability will be maintained by a fleet of 100 in line transport planes and operational transport vessels. The text does not call for the development of a transport plane with long-range action, but mentions the improvement of past agreements with air and sea companies.


In order fully to ensure its missions, the navy will have to continue having at its disposal a group of plane carriers and a suitable number of overseas presence vessels.

During his hearing before the Commission, the minister did not conceal his concern over the replacement of these various air and naval resources. He declared that it was possible that, for an undetermined period, the accumulated delays would no longer permit to have the totality of the scheduled number of combat planes and sea patrols available for combat. Priority concern is given to the oceanic strategic force and the maintenance of the aeronaval group and of the sea patrol aviation, immediately followed by the replacement of the surface fleet.

The draft law also mentions the protection of the territory on the mainland and overseas, DOT, which, supported by the gendarmerie, will use reserve personnel living in the neighborhood of the targets to be protected and be endowed with specific means better adapted to their mission.

Concerning chemical weapons capable of being used by the aggressor who has an abundance of them, the text specifies that France could not forgo using them and that it will acquire a suitable deterrent capacity.

Finally, the draft bill confirms our country's will to develop space programs and to pursue its research and development effort in all areas of new technologies capable of basically changing numerous aspects of modern defense.



Let us give credit to the new government for the swiftness with which it reacted to the stagnation in which the defense effort was sinking.

It formulated its new draft program-law in less than 6 months. To do so, it went to the core, i.e., the equipment to which it guaranteed extensive and regular resources. The proposed recovery is high-powered from the onset since, as shown in Yves Guena's report on the 1987 budget, defense will receive for the coming year 7,683 million francs more than it did last year, whereas from 1982 to 1986, the additional resources from which it actually benefited totaled only 5,541 million.

By primarily setting up financial goals to be reached, rather than detailed programs, and by assigning to them a regular annual growth of 6 percent in constant francs, the new plan is more realistic and finally more favorable to defense than the laws which referred to the PIBm. As a matter of fact, if, as Giraud remarked before the National Defense Commission, an economic growth of 2.8 percent is taken into account, and depending on whether Title III, that is to say, operating expenses, grows by 1 to 2 percent annually, the defense share would account for 3.90 to 3.97 percent of the GDPm. If, however, this growth were only 2 percent, then with only a 1 percent growth for Title III, the defense share would reach 4.03 percent.

The goal of 4 percent of the GDPm once set for defense by the previous governments has a good chance to be reached, or very nearly reached, in 1991. But this reference, which does not satisfy the maximalists who would have liked 4.5 percent, finally is less important than the strength and health of the economy which is the wellspring of the resources needed for defense.

6857

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## DISSATISFACTION OVER GOVERNMENT'S AIRCRAFT PURCHASE HANDLING

## Offsets Reportedly Overlooked

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 11-12 Jan 87 pp 1, 3

[Article by Nikos Simos: "An 'Incomplete' Agreement About the Aircraft Will Be Signed With the Americans Tomorrow"]

[Text] The contract with General Dynamics will be signed tomorrow although the question of offset benefits connected with the procurement of 40 F-16's remains unsettled. The only agreement regarding offsets is the one related to Category 1, namely, the joint production of parts for the aircraft, while no final agreement has been reached with regard to the amounts of the offsets in the defense sector, in general, and in the area of economic cooperation.

This uncertainty is considered to be inexcusable since the process for selection of the aircraft lasted 4 years. The offset benefits for Category 1--mentioned above--amount to 50 million dollars. There is no reason to believe that the remaining offset agreements when concluded will cover the amount of 950 million dollars to carry out the initial expectation that the offset benefits will total 1 billion dollars.

This is because the initial expectation was that General Dynamics was committed to provide offset benefits at the rate of 100 percent of the total amount of the purchase. It is also noted that the offsets agreement should have been signed prior to the signing of the final agreement for purchase of the aircraft. (The final agreement is being signed tomorrow.) The reason for signing the offset agreement prior to the final agreement was to allow the Greek side to exert pressure on the other side which was primarily concerned with selling its product.

It is also noted that the Greek government was satisfied with a mere oral promise from the company. As a result of this, any programs proposed by the American company, which cannot be implemented because of the inability of the Greek side to carry them out, are removed to an equal amount (investment or production cost) from the offset benefits which General Dynamics is committed to provide.

It should also be noted that because of poor handling by the Greek government, our country lost the opportunity to obtain 70 F-104 fighter aircraft, which we had sought from West Germany as a replacement for losses.

A recent message from the German General Staff said that the aircraft we asked for recently are not available because the Greek government, although it had agreed to receive the aircraft in 1982, postponed the transfer for 4 years. This led the Germans to react in this fashion.

The reaction of the West German government should be attributed--according to reliable diplomatic sources--to the fact that the members of the Bundestag Budget Committee responsible for approving the transfer of aircraft and spare parts to foreign countries, do not particularly like our country. The Greek delay allowed once again the cancellation of the transfer of aircraft sought by our country.

Now, since the 1982 opportunity was lost, it has been proposed to the Greek government to again open the question of the F-104 aircraft and spare parts we want. Talks at the political and military level will begin around the middle of January.

#### Policy Errors Scored

Athens PONDIKI in Greek 16 Jan 87 p 5

[Text] The sad story of the offset benefits for the F-16 purchase now came officially to its end with the signing of the contract 2 days ago. As PONDIKI predicted some time ago--and as was foreseen by others, most recently KATHIMERINI--we received peanuts instead of 100 percent of the value of the aircraft in offset benefits as was loudly proclaimed.

We are talking, of course, about the 100 percent of the offset benefits for 40 aircraft because there is nothing to say about any offset benefits for the additional 20 aircraft we are likely to get.

Of course, the problem started when we decided or were forced to buy the Mirage 2000's and the F-16's either because NATO wanted it this way or because we are threatened by Turkey. But after that we made a mess ourselves for two reasons, and no ifs, ands, or buts will be accepted.

The first blunder was that we chose the private agreement with General Dynamics instead of the intergovernmental agreement with the American government, presumably to avoid any blackmail from Washington and to get the offset benefits.

Now we will depend on the "shenanigans" of General Dynamics for spare parts, let alone that Washington will again have the last word. Because not even... Drosogiannis can say that if the American government objects to the delivery of spare parts, General Dynamics will ignore it and send the spare parts by the fastest route.

The second (and bigger) blunder was that we went and signed the contract for 40 F-16's without first reaching an agreement on offset benefits. From that moment on the representatives of General Dynamics started to throw spit balls at our negotiators or leave the room to go to the restroom as soon as the Greek negotiators raised the point that General Dynamics should fulfill its promises, or finally to turn their back and talk to each other about American football.

These people are sitting pretty since there was no commitment for offset benefits by the makers of the F-16, not even in the letter of intent signed in March 1985. In other words, we were walking barefoot into a field full of thorns...

In the midst of this confusion (which became even worse when in March 1986 the American government gave its approval for export of the F-16's to us) in April a new Greek negotiating team engaged in a new effort to extract some dollars from the Americans by forming a company which was to operate on business principles to utilize some dollar-producing programs. So, the offset agreement was signed and we may get in the end some 50 million dollars and be thankful at that.

But even that is not certain! Because the proposed company will not start to operate right away and to our benefit at that. The Americans may decide to pay some key employees to do nothing instead of getting involved in business and taking risks. Moreover, the Greeks may reject a program, but they will not have the right to propose one of their own.

Beyond that, General Dynamics has proposed and expects a reply by 16 February, whether the Greek Aerospace Industry will take part in the production of the fuselage of the 60--not 40--aircraft. If we say "yes", General Dynamics will gain more money while we will lose even more.

What is the conclusion? The conclusion is that we pay for the F-16's as though they were made of gold, and we will have almost no benefit at all. But here we are talking about great blunders and huge losses. Someone is to blame. Who is going to find who they are? Who is going to emasculate them? Always hoping for the best, we are waiting to see...

#### Purchase Differentiation Seen Onerous

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 25-26 Jan 87 p 5

[Article by Athens Deputy Stefanos Manos: "A Mistake by the Premier That Cost 286 Billion Drachmas"]

[Text] During the special session of the Chamber of Deputies [Vouli] on national defense, the premier repeated once more that the purchase of two types of military aircraft was exclusively his own political decision. He added that the additional cost resulting from this decision--about 500 million

dollars--is nothing compared to independence of the country which, in his view, is thus safeguarded most effectively.

Unfortunately, the government's tactic to dangerously sugar coat or even conceal reality while at the same time cover the often unfounded argument for secrecy, serious mistakes or omissions and the destructively slow implementation of Vouli's regulations did not provide for the possibility of broad comments on the premier's statement and for an assessment of its content and credibility.

It is necessary to point out certain salient points of the "purchase of the century": We purchase 40 Mirage 2000's for 9,170 million French francs (1,440 million dollars) and a few days ago agreed to purchase 40 American F-16's for 940 million dollars. Each French aircraft cost us 36 million dollars and each American F-16 23.5 million dollars. In other words, the 40 American aircraft cost us 500 million dollars less than the French. But regardless of the cost of each aircraft, the fact that we purchased two types of planes instead of one creates serious encumbrances.

If we bought 80 aircraft of the same type instead of 40 of one and 40 of another, we would have saved 600 million dollars. Why? Because we would have bought one instead of two flight simulators (costing 35 million dollars each) and only one maintenance simulator. We would limit expenses for training and the additional reserves of special equipment, spare parts and war materiel.

We would not purchase the special MATRA missiles for the Mirage aircraft at a cost of 80 million dollars. We would reduce technical support expenses and those for manuals--technical instruction, that is--for which the French ask more than 15 million dollars. We would further save money from the modification improvements of the two aircraft to one type.

Finally, the Greek Aircraft Industry would be maintaining only one type of aircraft and would not have to invest about 150 million dollars. All the aforementioned savings total about 600 million dollars and in his speech in Vouli the premier admitted that we could save 500 million.

But the encumbrances from the purchase of two types of aircraft will continue throughout their operational life. I have estimated that this additional cost during the 20-25 years of their operational life will be about another billion dollars because the two planes have nothing in common and because spare parts for the French planes cost at least twice as much as our past experience with the Mirage F-1 has proved.

Let me recapitulate: The decision to buy two types of aircraft will cost 600 million dollars right at the beginning and 1 billion dollars over a period of 20-25 years. In addition, the Mirage will cost us 500 million more than the F-16's. Therefore, the total additional cost for purchasing 40 Mirage 2000's and 40 F-16's instead of 80 F-16's is not 500 million dollars as the premier said but 2.1 billion dollars or 286 billion drachmas.

Something else. The F-16's are suitable for air-to-air and air-to-ground missions while the Mirage is--for economy reasons, I imagine--only for air-to-air missions. In order for the Mirage to play both roles we must spend 100 million dollars more in order to improve its radar for attacking targets on the ground and to equip it with proper arms. Both aircraft do not have electronic countermeasures which must be installed in the future at an additional expense of about 250 million dollars.

"For Us Money Does Not Count"

The premier told us that he arrived at his political decision--against the recommendation of the [Armed Forces] Staff--in order to have two independent suppliers and two sources for spare parts. A national defense deputy minister told me the same thing a month ago in Vouli. At that time he characteristically added--as did the premier 2 days ago--that "for us money does not count." True, the PASOK government seldom counts money. The premier's decision cost us 286 billion drachmas! I consider the argument about the independence of the two aircraft suppliers as poor for three reasons:

1. I think the firing system of the French aircraft (the firing system which in part coordinates the plane's electronics with the missile systems and bomb release on targets is perhaps the most important part of the craft) cannot be considered independent of American materiel deliveries.
2. France left Argentina in the lurch during the Falkland Islands crisis and had its technical personnel withdrawn when hostilities began--conditions similar to those provided in the agreement Greece reached with the [aircraft manufacturing] Dassault Company. As a result, the Argentinians had difficulty with the Exocet missiles. They fired 5-6 but only one found its target and 7 million dollars were literally thrown into the sea!
3. As things stand today the American electronic jamming systems can black out electronics in all our aircraft regardless of their type. Aircraft subject to such jamming conditions operate like the planes of World War I.

Imagine now what we could do with 2.1 billion dollars--what the premier's political decision cost us to buy 40 F-16's and 40 Mirage 2000's instead of 80 F-16's--in order to secure our independence. For 800 million dollars we could modernize the 50 Phantoms and the 50 Corsair A-7's we now have. Thus, we would have 80 F-16's and 50 super Phantoms--just as the poor Germans are doing. They seem to count their money in modernizing their Phantoms instead of purchasing new aircraft.

We could thus have 50 super Corsair A-7's which could be a much greater deterrent factor than the Mirage 2000 because they could strike ground targets at great depth regardless of weather conditions, day or night, and with great accuracy. The purchased Mirage 2000's are good only for aerial combat and only under specific weather conditions.

With some 800 million dollars we could install on all islands of the Eastern Aegean a sophisticated anti-aircraft system which would protect them effectively with very heavy losses to attacking enemy aircraft. At the Golan Heights in 1973 the Israeli Air force lost, within a few hours, about 100 Phantoms and Seahawks to a modern Syrian anti-aircraft system. In a subsequent phase, the enemy force may be able to neutralize this system but it will have suffered extremely heavy losses.

With another 300 million dollars we could have purchased 20 fully modernized helicopters which could offer invaluable anti-tank service and tremendous maneuverability because such a helicopter with sophisticated equipment can fly where needed and can attack not only tanks but landing ships as well. This maneuverability could be completed with the purchase of 10 additional large transport helicopters at a cost of about 15 million dollars each.

I repeat the computation: With 800 million dollars we could have modernized 100 aircraft which would be as battle worthy as the Mirage 2000. With 800 million more we would have had a particularly effective anti-aircraft defense. By spending 450 million dollars more we would have possessed modern anti-tank capability along with maneuverability. The total thus far is 2,050 million dollars. There are still 50 million dollars left from the additional cost caused by the premier's political decision. We could use this amount to improve our communications and the command and control system of our forces.

What I have described is only an example of better use of our resources. No doubt there are better ways. Instead of splitting the contract for aircraft we could have procured the various weapons I mentioned above from various countries and we would thus be sure of the sources for provision of spare parts.

The benefit we would derive from a wiser use of our limited resources would not only be limited to the best and most effective arming of our forces. We would have had the additional indirect advantages of forcing Turkey to spend much more of its limited resources in order to counterbalance our significant qualitative improvement. In other words, better use of our resources would cause additional costs to Turkey. In this specific case, I estimate that Turkey would have been forced to spend more than 2 billion dollars.

#### Why Was the "Error" Made?

After this explanation how can one justify the premier's decision to spend 2.1 billion dollars more for the purchase of aircraft? How can it be possible that in an open, democratic society such a colossal error can be made? Who is to blame? [It would not have happened]

--If the defense issues as well as the foreign policy issues were not crowded by piles of stupid, secret documents; if many of the hidden facts were the subject of some publicity, some exposure.

--If the General Staff of the Armed Forces functioned more as such and stopped the rivalries and chauvinism among the three arms.

--If the premier was not surrounded by such a large staff which, because it exclusively depends on him, has the supreme desire to please him by always saying "yes".

A peculiar logic also was used in the purchase of the F-16's--they were purchased directly from the company instead of through the Foreign Military Sales [FMS] system, a fact which added about 100 million dollars to the cost. The answer of the appropriate deputy to my relevant question in Vouli was not at all persuasive--rather he persuaded me there were reasons he did not want to reveal.

I want to mention another issue which concerns the defense of Cyprus. I mentioned earlier that if we had bought 80 planes of the same type instead of 40 of one and 40 of another, we would have saved an amount sufficient to purchase modern and maneuverable anti-aircraft and anti-tank equipment--the same equipment Cyprus needs.

By adopting a systematic program Cyprus itself could have such armaments in 5 or 10 years. Of course, it would have to considerably increase its defense expenditures which today represent proportionally less than half of course. I think my message is clear. Greek Cyprus can and must be able to defend itself. If it can achieve this then I am certain--as certain as day succeeds night--that it will gain its much longed-for independence.

I am an incurable optimist. I am certain that many of the Papandreu government mistakes are reversible--at some cost, of course, but reversible. The defense of the broader Greek area cannot be based on quantity; it cannot be based on nice words because they have no appeal to our adversaries. It can be based first on the systematic and unwavering search and elevation of our moral and human resources as well as of the quality and completeness of our armaments and second on converting our concerns into European Community concerns.

7520  
CSO: 3521/65

**CONSERVATIVE PAPER, MILITARY GROUPS JOIN HOLST, BULL-HANSEN DUEL****Defense Policy, Budget Issues**

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 Jan 87 p 2

[Editorial: "An Unwarranted Crusade"]

[Text] By means of weekly attacks in the form of statements, interviews, and lectures, Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst continues his polemical crusade against Defense Chief Fredrik Bull-Hansen and against what he considers to be political moves on the part of the defense chief. This is taking place at the cost of our national interests: Norway is not served when the authority and dignity of the defense chief are torn down week by week -- it damages the daily work of defense domestically and weakens the position of Norwegian officers in the continuing cooperation in the alliance. The prime minister should now step in and stop her defense minister before more damage is done.

The conflict actually deals with two rather different matters. The first is the defense chief's presentation last fall of the unchanged version of "Defense Studies 1985" with the politically scarcely realistic wish for a real growth in defense expenditures of seven percent. An open presentation of alternative plans is equally welcome and very useful, even if it must also follow a will for economy in defense in the internal organization. The fact that the presentation came so near in time to the budget debate is no reason for the great excitement.

More important, however, is that part of the conflict that concerns the interpretation of security policy statements. Here the defense chief has done nothing more than point out -- in accordance with official Norwegian policy -- that it would be a significant gain for the Soviet Union if the Nordic NATO countries "could be moved to hold back on the main questions concerning the alliance in order step by step to select a neutral course..."

As long as Norway's defense is based on a series of foreign policy assumptions -- we cannot assure Norway's safety alone -- it is also the task of the defense chief to point out what it means when these assumptions change or are changed. An example to show that this can quickly become timely is the Nordic civil servant group that the government wants to take part in discrediting in order to facilitate a Nordic nuclear free zone: Is the defense chief to be cut off

from expressing himself on the consequences of such a zone for cooperation in NATO and for the defense of Norway? Is this part of the reason for the cabinet minister's anger?

We have noticed that he has support in parts of the labor movement for his attacks against the defense chief: One of the Labor Party's group secretaries in the Storting, Lars Fure, began the campaign by means of an article in ARBEIDERBLADET. In the interests of defense and the country, the prime minister should now blow the whistle.

#### Association Official Attacks Muzzling

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 Jan 87 p 13

[Text] "The defense minister has shown that he has no concept of the most elementary principles of leadership." This is the opinion of Storting Representative Ingvald Godal (Conservative Party) given to AFTENPOSTEN. In reference to Cabinet Minister Johan Jorgen Holst's repeated rebukes of the defense chief, Godal said: "Matters like this are dealt with in private. A leader does not undermine a subordinate chief's authority by reprimanding him time after time openly."

Godal is also the vice president of Norway's Defense Union. He thinks that the defense minister -- who many times recently has asked the defense chief and other officers to take part more in public debate, to be sure in military-professional evaluations -- must now come to his senses.

#### Concern

Storting Representative Godal's starting point is, among other things, this: The need for a strong Norwegian defense will only increase in the future. People with a minimum of insight into the problems are concerned.

In this situation the country is so lucky that it has an excellent defense chief, General Fredrik Bull-Hansen. Since he is efficient and conscious of his responsibility, he has explained what according to his professional evaluation is needed for Norway to have a sufficient defense in the future, taking the developments in our close surroundings into account. This is his duty, Godal points out, and continues: To make people aware of the result is his right and shows his democratic disposition. It is a matter of course that he puts defense in a wider context and that he advises against steps in the direction of a neutral course -- because it will have a fundamental effect on the defense tasks he is there to solve.

#### No to Muzzel

Godal says he is glad to have been made acquainted with Defense Chief Bull-Hansen's professional evaluation, which he will support, directly and uncut. Therefore, Godal stressed to AFTENPOSTEN, "I will definitely have none of the defense minister trying to muzzle him. It is my extremely clear right to be

made acquainted with the defense chief's uncut opinion on these questions," the representative from Telemark added.

According to Godal it is meaningless to mix up the defense chief's duty and right to clarify and express himself with his duty to follow loyally the decisions the politicians have made. And the cabinet minister's use of words such as "Latin American conditions" is a severe insult to an efficient, responsible, and loyal servant, Storting Representative Godal said.

#### Neurotic

In conclusion he said, "Luckily Bull-Hansen's authority is so solid that Holst's attacks work against his purpose. After having witnessed the defense minister's neurotic conduct in this matter, one is forced to question whether the cabinet minister has the necessary balance to stand at the head of the country's defense in a difficult time.

#### Security Affairs Expert Comments

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Jan 87 p 2

[Op Ed Article by Nils Orvik: "The Defense Chief and the Politician Holst"]

[Text] Few things are worse than to hear bright people talk against their better knowledge. Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst knows better than most that in a security policy evaluation it is not practically possible to treat the military and the political factors separately. They are parts of the same thing.

#### The Study Group

Holst was along as the youngest man when a small group of civilians and military first began in the 1960's to create a security policy study and debate atmosphere in Norway. This group (Security Policy Study Group), which was led by John Sanness and the undersigned from the university sector, also had a series of military members. Among them Bjorn Egge, Tonne Huitfeldt -- and Fredrik Bull-Hansen.

One of the goals from the civilian side was to get the military to put stronger emphasis on the political and economic factors, at the same time as we for our part tried to learn more about the military part of the subject. This led among other things to Tonne Huitfeldt, Jens A. Christophersen and myself making a plan for political science becoming a special subject at the war college. The mutual exchange was continued and further developed in seminars and other meetings in the following years.

#### A Matter of Course

For people who have dealt with security policy on a speciality basis it is a matter of course -- if one does not try on purpose to distort the relationships --

that it is impossible to undertake a security policy total evaluation on the level the defense chief is supposed to give it without both the military and political points of view being included and given the same weight. The Defense Minister's numerous writings give the best proof that this is the case. How would Holst react if he received the order not to include the military factors in his political explanations of security policy?

Would have Been Bad

Defense Chief Bull-Hansen deserves full honor and recognition from all parties and groups for having shown professional integrity and responsibility by following the guidelines for security policy analysis that everyone in this field, including Holst, have always agreed upon. We have little to offer in weapons and equipment to those we call in every year to defend the country's freedom and security. It would be doubly bad if those who have this thankless task also should be burdened with unreasonable and professionally unjustifiable limitations in the evaluations that it is their duty to undertake for the sake of the country and the people.

We must therefore in our long range national interest hope that the defense chief will not let himself be frightened by the politically motivated complaints but rather hold fast on the course he has begun. He stands on a secure, professional base.

#### Military Journal Supports Bull-Hansen

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Jan 87 p 12

[Text] NORSK MILITAERT TIDSSKRIFT gives Defense Chief Fredrik Bull-Hansen unreserved support in his well-defined standpoint on making professional military views known to the public. At the same time the newspaper in its most recent issue gives a complete account of the lecture the defense chief gave to the Oslo Military Union 1 December last year that was criticized by Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst.

NORSK MILITAERT TIDSSKRIFT is published by the Oslo Military Union, and in a preface to the defense chief's lecture, the editor, Lieutenant General Tonne Huitfeldt, writes: "The defense chief has used the Oslo Military Union as a forum for important orientations of principle in 1984, 1985, and 1986. The fact that the defense chief has gone public with his evaluations and recommendations has also awakened dissatisfaction in some areas. But it is an essential part of our democratic system for the people to be fully orientated on the professional evaluations of the military chiefs so that they themselves can form a reasoned opinion on such decisive questions as the contribution of defense to Norwegian security and independence. NORSK MILITAERT TIDSSKRIFT is glad that the defense chief is holding steady in his views to the public, and we present here his lecture to the Oslo Military Union of 1 December 1986."

## Paper Attacks Speaking Ban

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 Jan 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Holst Decides"]

[Text] Defense cannot have two bosses. In our democracy it is the defense minister, not the defense chief, who has the political authority and is the head of the defense forces. Former Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen pointed this out strongly in an interview with ARBEIDERBLADET. And obviously Gerhardsen is right. In a democratically led community there must never be doubt that it is the sitting defense minister who has the overall responsibility for defense leadership.

But this is not what the present conflict between Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst and the defense chief, General Fredrik Bull-Hansen, is concerned with. Since the defense minister himself has interpreted the defense chief absurdum, we have received a debate that easily can leave the impression that it is Bull-Hansen who wants to decide over Holst. Every hint in this direction must necessarily fall of its own lack of logic.

Defense Minister Holst will continue to be the head, at any rate as long as the Labor Party is in power and the prime minister wants him. But there are some of us who think that the defense minister is acting unwisely -- and in conflict with both the interests of defense and of the people -- when he wants to muzzle the defense chief.

A reasonable debate on the question of competency that arises here presupposes that one is able to separate political and professional responsibility. As Gerhardsen stresses, there is no doubt about who is defense's highest authority. But it is just as clear that one must be able to allow the right to speak to the top professional military chief without in the process questioning the constitutional and political responsibility of the defense minister.

When Gerhardsen gives the impression that today's competency conflict between Holst and Bull-Hansen is almost identical to the conflict we experienced shortly after the war between the then defense minister, Jens Chr. Hauge, and the generals Ruge and Helset, the comparison fails in a very decisive point. Defense Chief Fredrik Bull-Hansen has never indicated the slightest doubt that it is the political authorities, and they alone, who set the framework and decide the development in defense. Nor has the present defense chief attacked the cabinet minister's authority and competence as the top responsible leader in defense.

But then the defense minister ought to be mature enough to allow the defense chief to give his professional evaluations both to the authorities and to the public. As part of the democratic decision-making process -- and as a contribution to maintain the will to defense -- the sitting government should be able to tolerate the expression of different opinions and to allow the people to be oriented. Holst cannot possibly be so uncertain of himself that he will forbid his foremost military chief from saying what he has on his heart. The goal is certainly -- in spite of everything -- the same for both the cabinet minister and the defense chief.

9124

CSO: 3639/13

## PAPER REASSERTS CRITICISM OF CENTER PARTY FOR DEFENSE STAND

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Jan 87 p 2

[Editorial: "The Whole Picture in the North"]

[Text] Stories are told about many politicians, not always equally flattering (not always equally true, either). It is said of the former Swedish prime minister, Thorbjorn Falldin, that one day he got into a taxi in front of the Riksdag building. The taxi driver understood that the passenger had something to do with politics and asked if he had heard the latest story about Falldin. "I am Falldin," the reply came from the back seat. "That doesn't matter," the driver answered, "I'll tell it very slowly."

The Center Party chairman Johan J. Jakobsen showed in an article in AFTENPOSTEN yesterday that he does not want to understand the contents of our objections to the statement by the three Nordic Center Parties on the northern areas. We will therefore tell it very slowly, for the third time.

There have long been strong military imbalances in these areas. For years here there has been a massive buildup of Soviet forces both on land (Kola) and at sea. At the same time on the Norwegian and allied side one has been extremely reserved. In recent years NATO has attempted to correct this. The allied presence in the area has grown stronger, and the exercises held have become larger and more frequent.

But this evening out of the strength relationships has not been concluded. In this situation the statement by the three Center Parties has the wrong content and the wrong address. The three do not mention the imbalance that still exists, nor the Soviet strength buildup. The statement is formulated as if all the countries in the area had the same occasion to retreat. In this way the picture is completely twisted, and this we have censured.

To this Jakobsen says that in other connections he has cooperated in drawing the whole picture, not just a part of it. But of course this does not help the matter. The fact that the Storting's defense committee has called a spade a spade is no excuse for the Nordic Center Parties not doing so.

The chairman of the Center Party also reacts negatively when we say that in matters of security policy one must be careful with whom one makes a joint statement. We do not like to use the expression naive, but this is naive. Norway and Finland -- and Norwegian and Finnish parties -- have completely different starting points for evaluations of their security needs. As long as the Nordic cooperation has existed, realistic politicians have taken this factor into consideration.

When someone criticizes its behavior, the Center Party has the bad habit of "questioning motives." The party chairman is doing this. He is trying in the article to lead the debate astray by saying that AFTENPOSTEN is reacting "neurotically," whatever this may mean in this connection. And we "forget" that relaxation of tensions in the northern areas is official Norwegian policy(!) Jakobsen will improve his contribution to the debate if he reads what we actually have written. There he will also find that the only thing that concerns us in this matter is Norway's security. Which is not served by the last contribution from Jakobsen and his Swedish and Finnish party colleagues.

9124

CSO: 3639/15

**Deregistering of Merchant Fleet Would Hurt NATO in War**

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Jan 87 p 11

[Article by Cato Guhnfeldt: "NATO Without Norwegian Ships"]

[Text] With the deregistration now taking place in the Norwegian merchant fleet, it will in a short time be impossible for Norway to maintain its supply duties in the sea lanes for its NATO partners. It will also be impossible to assist in the reinforcement of allied and Norwegian supply lines to Norway in case of war. This can be read in a partial analysis of the merchant fleet's preparedness duties, which the supreme defense command has worked out.

Details in the analysis are not available yet. According to the Defense Department's press spokesman, Erik Senstad, the analysis is part of a large amount of material that is at the moment being evaluated by a committee formed by the general inspector for sea defence. In the committee, which was formed 15 January, there are representatives from both the General War Commission, the Directorate for Seamen, Norway's Shipbuilders' Union, and the Commerce Department, as well as the supreme command from defense.

Senstad says that the committee by the end of January will have evaluated tomorrow's need for seamen in a war situation and also what resources the sea defense can contribute to strengthen the Norwegian merchant fleet in such a situation. By the end of February the committee is to have charted possible legal hindrances in being able to put parts of the mobilization reserves of sea defence at the disposition of the merchant fleet in case of war. If formal hindrances are found on this point, the committee will present proposals for necessary changes in the law.

With today's situation and a possible continuation of deregistering, one will also evaluate whether it is possible to arrange conditions to use Norwegian-owned, but foreign registered ships in a situation of war or crisis.

"For our NATO allies the decline in the merchant fleet under Norwegian flag is clearly of concern," Department Head Leif A. Nygaard of the Commerce Department's shipping section said. "The situation has already been discussed centrally in NATO. The government intends to clarify the complete preparedness situation in the shipping report that will be presented in the Storting in the course of the spring session. In the report possible suggestions for

correction of the situation will be made," Nygaard said.

9124

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## COAST GUARD EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTIES WITH SEA LYNX COPTERS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Jan 87 p 64

[Article by Cato Guhnfeldt: "Weakened Coast Guard Preparedness"]

[Text] The Coast Guard has great problems with its Sea Lynx helicopters. Helicopter missions must constantly be broken off, completely cancelled, or in the best circumstances carried out with reduced effect. In 1986 there were on the average only two-three of a total of six helicopters operational at any one time. The main reasons for the situation are continual technical faults, lack of reserve parts, and a low level of experience among the personnel who do the more difficult maintenance of the helicopters at Bardufoss Air Base.

Mistakes and shortages put daily stumbling blocks in the path of the planning of missions in the 337 Squadron, which operates Sea Lynx helicopters on board the Coast Guard ships, but with a home base on Bardufoss.

"We must constantly break off missions because of very small difficulties," Squadron Commander Major Tom Rosenberg said. "Often they are trifles such as faults in packaging or bolts that stop us. The number of operational helicopters this year, for example, has repeatedly been plagued by fuel leakage from both helicopters' motors because of a faultily constructed rapid coupling. We can install completely new couplings, but it still leaks. Since we do not accept leaks, we are left standing. We are working with the problem but have not yet found a satisfactory solution," Rosenberg said.

Other operators of Sea Lynx helicopters abroad have experienced comparable problems. Since Sea Lynx became operational in the Norwegian defense forces in 1981, there have been repeated faults, particularly connected to the motor's oil pressure system as well as the hydraulic systems. Pressure problems and signs of error have been the order of the day. Since 1981 one has in the 337 Squadron, for example, experienced over fifty cases of faults in the oil pressure during flying.

#### Problems Known

"As far as the worst technical problems are concerned, we have noticed an improvement since summer," Rosenberg said. "The spare parts situation has also gotten a little better, thanks to the recent efforts by the British producer,

Westland. On the other hand we have continual problems with the great turnover of personnel at the aircraft technical squadron at Bardufoss, which carries out heavy maintenance on the Sea Lynx machines. The low level of experience leads to delays, and this too hits the squadron's operational ability," he said.

#### Improvement

The problems in the 337 Squadron are well known at the Air Force Supply Command at Kjeller. According to Major Reidar Andersen at the helicopter office here things are going a little better for the 337 Squadron than before. This is probably because last fall a decision was made to make an effort to tackle the problem. Therefore one is in the process of going through all the maintenance routines to make them function as flawlessly as possible. The situation will probably therefore get somewhat better this spring and early summer, Rosenberg thinks.

In the squadron one also hopes that the Coast Guard helicopters will receive more modern equipment to ease the operational maintenance.

9124  
CSO: 3639/15

## PAPER ATTACKS CENTER PARTY CHIEF FOR COMMENTS ON DEFENSES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Jan 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Moderation and Strength"]

[Text] A visible military presence is a necessary part of a firm but moderate security policy for the northern areas. The Center Party has selected the wrong company and the wrong message for its statement.

If two sides are equally strong, mutual strength reductions will mean that they maintain the balance. On the other hand, if one is clearly stronger than the other, the "mutual reductions" can just about mean that the weaker side is disarming itself. In the northern areas one has long had such an imbalance, with a colossal military striking force on the Soviet side and an extreme caution on the Norwegian (and allied) side.

When this is the case, one must think very carefully before one sends similar appeals to all countries to show more caution. And one should be very careful with whom one makes common statements. AFTENPOSTEN has criticized the Center Party and its chairman, Johan J. Jakobsen, for having neglected both factors. He has made the same appeal to everyone, and he has done it together with the Center Parties in Sweden and Finland. The fact that DAGBLADET has given its support does not make the Center statement better. The newspaper has ceased to understand what the matter is all about. The point in our criticism is clearly not that it is "in conflict with Norwegian policy to show caution in the North," as DAGBLADET puts it. The point is that one must not make moderation a mania.

In one period the Norwegian and allied reserve was so great that there was almost an absence in the North. Therefore the task cannot be to have more of this lopsidedness, but to achieve a better balance. What is needed is a more visible military presence from the Western side, particularly in the form of regular maneuvers. We have infinitely long to go in this way before there will be even the faint odor of provocation against the Soviets or Soviet strength.

We must have three coalescing goals for our security policy in the most exposed Norwegian waters and land areas. This is to maintain a military strength that protects against adventurous and attack policy from the other side. It is to create peace and to further relaxation of tension. And it is to keep uncontested, total control over Norwegian territory. If we are to reach all these goals, we

must be very careful in making a "neutral zone" out of this area. And we must be even more careful in suggesting that the low level of activity we have had up to now should be lowered even more.

Least of all should Norwegian political leaders send out such statements together with representatives from neutral states. They necessarily find themselves in a different situation from us, and they have other interests. One of those taking the initiative in the infamous Center statement on the northern areas was the Finnish foreign minister. It must be said of Finnish foreign policy that it is not ours and that we must see to it that it does not become ours.

9124  
CSO: 3639/14

## NAVAL OFFICERS, NONSOCIALIST MP'S PROTEST MINISTER'S COMMENT

Naval Officer: 'Immensely Provocative'

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 Jan 87 p 6

[Article by Roger Magnergard and Sune Olofson: "Naval officers in a Rage: Shocked to Their Souls"; first paragraph is SVENSKA DAGBLADET introduction]

[Text] Naval officers are raging against Roine Carlsson's statement. They believe that the defense minister has deprived them of their honor and reputation, and they feel deeply shocked.

Commander Jan Munte is the commanding officer of the coastal corvette Malmo:

"By God! The defense minister has taken honor and reputation away from naval personnel. With that statement he has exposed his innermost thoughts, namely that naval officers and ships are trash. I believe the defense minister should come out to us, look us in the eye and say that we should pack up and go home. The statement means that he does not believe in our work."

Commander Sven Carlson:

"I don't believe it is true. If the statement is correctly quoted, I am amazed. Roine Carlsson has himself been out aboard naval units and should know that coastal corvettes are the only powerful means we have to oppose the territorial penetrations effectively."

Commander Hans von Hofsten:

"The defense minister has been on board on several occasions, and he knows that naval officers sacrifice their free time and comforts in a way that hardly exists anywhere else in Sweden. I can't believe that he would express himself in that scornful and contemptuous way."

Makes It No Easier

Commander Herman Faltstrom, chief of the Studies Branch of the Defense Staff:

"As a naval officer I feel deeply shocked. The statement does not make our work any easier for the OB [Supreme Commander], national authorities and politicians in creating a foundation for the material content of the Defense Decision."

Commander Karl Andersson, Karlskrona:

"The statement is very provocative and unwise. That which the defense minister is calling 'a saddle cloth' is nothing more than a fighting machine, and an advanced one.

"It sounds as if the defense minister believes that we have luxury yachts in the Navy, when the coastal corvettes are technically comparable with the best that the major powers can produce of the same size. The statement is exceptionally stupid, it is degrading to naval officers as professional people and the technicians who constructed the ships."

#### Need Support

Commodore Gustaf Taube, chief of personnel at the Naval Staff:

"This is terrible. The defense minister's statement comes at a time when we have our hands full trying to get officers to remain after hard wear, overtime and furthermore a struggle to keep foreign penetrators from our territory. Naval personnel consider the statement that they should 'stand and glitter on the bridge' as incredibly negative. We need to have support from our highest leadership, not this type of harassment."

#### Carl Bildt Attacks Comment

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 Jan 87 p 6

[Article by Roger Magnergard and Sune Olofson: "Nonsocialist Politicians Protest: 'Serious, Unjustifiable"'; first paragraph is SVENSKA DAGBLADET introduction]

[Text] Conservative Party leader Carl Bildt demands an immediate apology from Defense Minister Roine Carlsson. Bildt believes that the statement will have echoes abroad.

Carl Bildt characterized Roine Carlsson's views as "slighting" and "scandalous."

"The statement discloses the thinking behind the Social Democrat and Liberal Parties' defense agreement. The Viggen is our only currently effective air defense system, for which the taxpayers will pay billions of kronor during this century. The Viggen system is vital and makes up 80 percent of the Swedish Air Force. The coastal corvettes are the main element in antisubmarine warfare.

"I believe that the defense minister's statement will have serious effects in the defense forces in a difficult time. In all probability it will be noticed

abroad. The question is whether the Liberal Party thinks the same way, obviously it does.

"The defense minister should immediately apologize to naval officers and the Air Force."

'Plant Foreman'

MP Gunnar Bjork (Center Party), member of the Defense Committee:

"In the first place the statement is aimed against a group which has worked harder than many others and forsakened family and home for several years. The highest leader in the Defense Ministry expresses himself worse than an old plant foreman. It is unwarrantable that an old labor union leader can express himself this way.

"This just shows that the Center Party's criticism of personnel policies is well founded. We will continue to demand that the defense forces be a better employer."

'Should Have Been Quiet'

MP Hans Lindblad (Liberal Party), member of the Defense Committee:

"Roine Carlsson used to be silent at other times, he should have been silent this time also. If naval officers chose to glitter on the command bridges they would have chosen icebreakers. Icebreakers have great command bridges. Coastal corvettes have hardly any command bridges at all. Naval officers sit enclosed amidst a mass of instruments, radars and PPIs.

"A coastal corvette costs 400 million kronor. It contains very little steel plate for so much money. There is no ship in the world with so little hull which has so much electronics and other equipment. The coastal corvette can lead half the fleet, in effectiveness it is comparable to our old Smaland-class destroyers."

Against Viggen

"I am against building more Viggens. On this point I agree with Roine Carlsson. To make new construction from the technique of the 60's, which would be delivered one year before we get JAS, does not seem wise. For the billions invested the Drakens are much better than the Viggens."

#### Roine Carlsson's Background Analyzed

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 Jan 87 p 7

[Article by Peter Bratt: "This Is How He Hurts Himself Again--Rough Proletarian in the Salons"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] It was in Hanoi in November 1982. Two days earlier Roine Carlsson stood beside Vietnam's vice prime minister Do Muoi and they vied with each

other as to who would be the first to cut through the red silk ribbon held by two pretty girls--one Swedish and one Vietnamese--before the factory doors of the paper factory at Bai Bang.

It was the official dedication, and Roine Carlsson represented Sweden as assistant minister of industry. He had taken over that post one month before after having been the chairman of the Paper Workers Union for 12 years.

The dedication went well. Roine Carlsson had gone through the paper factory located on a plain out in the countryside a few tens of miles outside of Hanoi.

He thought the factory was fine, and he knew what he was talking about. For 13 years, from 1951 to 1964 he worked in the paper factory at Hallstavik, several miles north of Norrtalje, before he became a fulltime union official.

#### Compulsory Labor

Now there was a reception at the Swedish Embassy in Hanoi, with cocktails, wine and something to eat. There came word of a short press conference, and journalists and people from SIDA [Swedish International Development Authority] and the Foreign Ministry went into a nearby room.

It was then that Roine Carlsson hurt himself for the first time.

"With regard to your union background, do you think it is important that there is compulsory labor in the forest cutting for the Bai Bang factory or not," asked a radio journalist?

"It is an internal question for the Vietnamese how the manpower for the Bai Bang project is recruited," answered Roine.

He was totally correct in that. It was an actual confirmation on his part. SIDA and the Foreign Ministry had made some summary investigations without succeeding in finding compulsory labor. The issue had not been taken up with the Vietnamese and therefore the question of recruiting the manpower was at that time an internal Vietnamese concern.

#### Overbearing Bigwig

A normal politician would have said that, and added that he was naturally against forced labor. It costs nothing and is not dangerous to say.

But Roine stuck fast to his assertion that recruiting was an internal Vietnamese question, and then the press conference was over and he stalked resolutely out of the room.

We journalists were completely amazed. Such an insolent fool! Just his appearance had provoked gold fever in us.

He had really behaved like the prototype of an overbearing bigwig. He majestically put out his opinion, refused to explain, and walked away.

As he had explained himself, or failed to explain himself, it appeared clear that he did not care whether the Vietnamese used slaves or not. He was not concerned about what they did, the main thing was that the raw materials came in. Those were his words and now he had to eat them.

#### Still Worse

We had borrowed bicycles from the embassy, that was the only way to get around Hanoi, and we rode home to the hotel in the fall twilight.

"Not smart. Maybe they can act like that in the unions, but as a politician he should quickly change his style," said the radio journalist.

But the next week it became still worse. Then he went to Kiruna to talk with people from the union, the municipality and business. A Norrland package was being assembled, and he wanted to reconnoiter.

But up there they wanted to have some PR so they ordered out 2,000 school children who stood before the TV cameras and waited when Roine arrived in a black limousine which somebody had arranged.

Roine is afraid of journalists. He does not trust them, does not understand how they think and does not know how to deal with them.

"I speak when I want to and not when the mass media commands. I am not a player piano," he said.

He did not intend to talk to the school children and he did not intend to give a speech or make any promises. He just wanted to hear from the people how things were going.

He was more or less forced up onto the speaker's platform but only briefly said that he had nothing to say. He strode away through the school children and disappeared.

"He showed up like a mafia boss," said SSU's [Social Democratic Youth of Sweden] local chairman, which was reported by all the media. "The entire population got the picture of a small, fat bigwig in a limousine who didn't care about the people."

It was probably only in his home town of Hallstavik that they knew it was not so. He was never loquacious. When he was elected union chairman in 1970 his first speech from the platform consisted of the following four words: "Thanks for the confidence!" But his heart was in the right place, even though he did not know how to express himself.

Roine Carlsson was born in 1937. His mother was alone, and immediately after seven years of elementary school he began as a laborer at one of the two blacksmith shops at the plant. One was communist and the other was social democrat, and they discussed politics regularly. The factory was Roine's real school.

The union chairman, Hugo Nilsson, took care of Roine as if he were his own son.

To Stockholm

So he became chairman of the SSU club in the 50's and was given a large number of tasks in the municipality beside the union members. In 1965 he became ombudsman in the Paper Workers Union and moved to Stockholm. In 1970 he became the youngest chairman ever in LO [Trade Union Confederation] at age 32.

He received notice in the press because he wanted to reintroduce socialization into the confederation's statutes, and he demanded nationalization of the forestry industry.

A radical chairman of LO who wanted quickly to turn Sweden into a socialist state and who wanted to confiscate the profits of business was a rare sight. Within LO one should be a "gray socialist."

The fact is that Roine Carlsson was one of the most driving forces in introducing the wage earner funds, but he wanted a more radical solution than today's toothless variation.

After the row in Kiruna there was just one more commotion, and that was a couple of weeks later when two seamstresses from Eiser wanted to meet Roine unannounced to appeal to him to save a factory.

The TV news showed how the fierce Roine slammed the door in their faces. The newspaper EXPRESSEN had a center spread: "Seamstresses Cry When Roine Slams Door."

But Roine had no idea they were seamstresses. He thought they belonged to that hated horde of journalists who constantly plagued him. He complained that he could not take out the garbage from his three-room flat in Jakobsberg without falling over journalists in the stairway.

But later things calmed down through all of 1983, 84, 85 and 86. When he became defense minister in 1985 several editorial writers, even in the nonsocialist press, thought it was an excellent choice.

And everything went well until the publication of the saddle-cloth interview on 15 January this year. He has visited numerous units and almost everybody who met him has been positive.

At the Defense Staff they have the impression that he tackles problems quickly, has the ability to make decisions and has clear ideas about what he is doing.

Why then have things gone as they have? This is the picture one gets:

In a way Roine Carlsson reminds one of Thorbjorn Falldin. He has no polish, he is unsophisticated, and in fact he is uneducated. None of these qualities

are acceptable in Stockholm's salons. Here most people are highly educated, and above all they know the language and manners.

Too many people master to perfection the art of talking and talking without saying anything. Put a microphone under their noses and you just get a bunch of noise to interpret, as though they were explaining why they strangled their grandmother.

Roine Carlsson has a coarse-grained manner of speaking, filled with similes. He does not literally mean what he says. He should have a translator. He lacks the ability to say clearly and exactly what he means. He is uncertain about the nuances of words, and what effects words have outside his circle of friends.

This results from the fact that he has an entirely different form of education than the middleclass that he must most often cooperate with.

That is why he avoids journalists and all situations where he can be quoted and does not dare be himself. When he does dare, witnesses agree that he is both talkative, funny and pleasant. Then the stiffness leaves his body and the taut motionlessness, and he uses a body language which replaces the words he cannot master.

#### Loves the Sea

He was irritated at the naval officers who, despite his having done much for the Navy, just continued to complain. Many of them are politically conservative, and it is not difficult to see an organized campaign between them and the conservative press aimed against social democratic defense policies. He wants to give them a rap on the nose.

It is also pertinent that he is from Roslagen, loves the sea, and goes out whenever he has the chance. Several years ago he said that he would like to be the ombudsman of the sea, so that he could get rid of all the unsightly plate boxes floating around and calling themselves boats.

He thinks they are ugly. If he had just said this: "Big boats are not appropriate. It is better to invest in small units than in more coastal corvettes. They function more as objects for boasting." Then nothing would have happened.

#### Emotional Effect

The "saddle-cloth" remark and the "glittering" comment still stand. And actually he has not said a word about the current work of the Navy. It is the emotional effect of the words of which he was unaware.

In Stockholm as well as in Hanoi.

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